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Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation
Erin C. Fuse Brown*
Our excess health care spending in the United States is driven largely by our high health
care prices. Our prices are so high because they are undisciplined by market forces, in a
health care system rife with market failures, which include information asymmetries,
noncompetitive levels of provider market concentration, moral hazard created by health
insurance, multiple principal-agent relationships with misaligned incentives, and
externalities from unwarranted price variation and discrimination. These health care
market failures invite a regulatory solution. An array of legal and policy solutions are
typically advanced to control our health care prices and spending, including: (1) market
solutions that focus on transparency and consumerism to discipline health care prices;
(2) antitrust enforcement to promote competition in the provider market; (3) consumer
protections that protect individual uninsured or underinsured patients from unfair prices;
(4) health care payment and delivery reforms that alter financial incentives of health care
providers to reduce overutilization and improve efficiency; and (5) regulation of provider
payment rates. The literature on these health care policy approaches reflects the
fragmentation of the U.S. health care system, typically considering each approach in
isolation, and it is difficult to make sense of an a la carte menu of approaches. This
Article sets forth an analytic framework to simultaneously and comprehensively evaluate
all the policy solutions to discipline health care prices by measuring each solution for its
ability to address the health care market failures. Applying this policy-against-marketfailure analysis leads to the following conclusion: only one solution—rate regulation—is
capable of addressing the widespread and growing provider monopoly problem. More
politically popular market approaches such as price transparency and payment and
delivery reforms can correct the market failures from information asymmetries and
principal-agent problems, but because they do not address the market power of providers,
they will be ineffective to control health care prices and spending without accompanying
rate regulation. It is time to resurrect rate regulation and place it squarely in the center of
any policy strategy to control health care prices and spending.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. My deepest
appreciation to the Saint Louis University Center for Health Law Studies, and the American Society
for Law, Medicine & Ethics for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this Article at the 2014
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Jessica Mantel, David Orentlicher, Nirej Sekhon, Elizabeth Sepper, Anne Tucker, Jason Turner,
Deepa Varadarajan, Sidney Watson, and Ramsi Woodcock for their helpful comments and feedback.
Many thanks to Genevieve Razick for her research assistance. All errors are my own.
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Introduction
In the United States we spend considerably more on health care than
any other wealthy, developed country whether measured as a percentage
1
of GDP or on a per capita basis. According to health economists, the
2
explanation of our excess health care spending is: “It’s the prices, stupid.”
We spend more in the United States on health care because our health
3
care prices are high. That may sound like a tautology, but it is not.
Higher health care expenditures in the United States might alternatively
be explained by higher consumption, that we are sicker or fatter than our
counterparts in Europe or Asia, that we have more defensive medicine as
a result of our malpractice system, or that we have higher administrative
costs from our fragmented and complicated system of providers and
4
payers. However, none of these factors sufficiently explain our excess
5
health care spending. The story of our unchecked health care spending in
6
the United States is a story about high and undisciplined prices. The price
dynamics of our health care system are epitomized by the chaotic and
complex pricing system for hospital services, which are an outsized
exemplar of the larger pricing problem in U.S. health care.
The nonsystem for hospital pricing is particularly bewildering when
observed on the level of the individual patient. Hospital services are
among the most expensive things we will buy in our lifetime, but we do
not shop for hospital care like any other similarly large purchase, such as

1. Luca Lorenzoni et al., Health-Care Expenditure and Health Policy in the USA Versus Other
High-Spending OECD Countries, 384 Lancet 83, 83 (2014).
2. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is so Different From
Other Countries, 22 Health Aff. 89, 103 (2003).
3. In the health care context, the terms “price,” “spending,” “cost,” and “charge” have different
and often confused meanings. In this Article, health care prices are the amounts a provider expects to
be paid by payers and patients for the items and services rendered; health care spending is the amount
of expenditures by public (government) and/or private households or institutions on health care goods
and services; health care costs are the direct and indirect input costs to the provider incurred to deliver
the health care services to the patients; and charges are the rates the provider sets for a given item or
service before any negotiated or governmental discounts. See Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n, Price
Transparency in Health Care: Report from the HFMA Price Transparency Task Force 5–7 (2014);
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., OECD Factbook 2011–2012: Economic Environmental and
Social Statistics (2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/12/03/03/index.html?/
ns/Chapter&itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2011-112-en (defining health expenditure).
4. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World, 24 Health Aff. 903, 904 (2005); Hamilton Moses III et al., The Anatomy of
Health Care in the United States, 310 JAMA 1947, 1949 (2013).
5. U.S. health care spending is “excess” in the sense that it exceeds the amount that one would
expect the United States to spend given its wealth in comparison to other OECD countries. Based on
national income and health spending in other OECD countries, analysts would expect the United
States to spend about eleven percent of GDP on health care (or $4849 per capita), far less than the
more than seventeen percent of GDP (or nearly $8000 per capita) than it does spend. David Squires,
Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An International Comparison of Supply,
Utilization, Prices, and Quality, 10 Commonwealth Fund, May 2012, at 3.
6. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 103.

H - Fuse Brown_26 (Hamilton12.7) (Do Not Delete)

88

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/15/2015 6:00 PM

[Vol. 67:85

a house, a car, or a college degree. Hospital prices are not just high; they
are almost completely impenetrable and senseless to the patient-consumer,
characterized by extreme variation, price discrimination, opacity, and
7
complexity. Most hospitals will not (or cannot) reveal the price of an
MRI, hip replacement, or any other hospital service until they have
8
already delivered the care and the bill. The same service may cost a
9
fraction of the price at a hospital just a few miles away. The price
patients are charged depends on who is paying and the hospital’s market
10
power, not its costs or quality. If the patient is paying for the hospital
care out-of-pocket, she may pay double what an insurance company would
11
pay, and three times what Medicare pays. Many individuals go bankrupt,
lose their homes to liens or foreclosure, have their wages seized, or their
credit damaged as a result of unaffordable hospital bills and aggressive
12
debt collection practices. The chaos and lack of restraint in hospital
pricing creates enormous personal and systemic harms as both prices and
patients’ share of their health care costs rise. The problems of excess U.S.
health care spending and the bewildering individual experience of hospital
billing stem from a failure of markets to discipline prices in the health care
system.
The market for health care services is beset by features of market
13
failure. The U.S. health care system is characterized by information
7. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 11, 15–29
(2014).
8. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy,
25 Health Aff. 57, 64–66 (2006).
9. Office of Info. Prods. and Data Analytics, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Medicare Fee-For Service Provider Utilization and Payment Data Inpatient Public Use
File: A Methodological Overview 3 (2014), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Inpatient.html; accord Editorial,
The Murky World of Hospital Prices, N.Y. Times (May 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
05/17/opinion/the-murky-world-of-hospital-prices.html; Sarah Kliff & Dan Keating, One Hospital Charges
$8,00 — Another, $38,000, Wash. Post Wonkblog (May 8, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/08/one-hospital-charges-8000-another-38000/.
10. Office of the Att’y Gen. Martha Coakley, Examination of Health Care Cost Trends
and Cost Drivers Pursuant to G.L. c. 118G, § 61/2(b): Report for Annual Public Hearing 3, 16–
27 (2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf [hereinafter Massachusetts
AG 2010 Report].
11. See Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 62; Gerard Anderson, From ‘Soak the Rich’ To ‘Soak the
Poor’: Recent Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 Health Aff. 780, 781 (2007).
12. Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative
Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 535, 548–49 (2006); Christopher
Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures,
18 Health Matrix 65, 66–68 (2008).
13. See, e.g., Competition in the Healthcare Marketplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Consumer Protection, Prod. Safety & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Trans., 111th Cong.
15 (2009) (statement of Len M. Nichols, Dir., Health Policy Program, New America Foundation);
Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 Antitrust
L.J. 857, 862–63 (2004); Bruce C. Vladeck & Thomas Rice, Market Failure and the Failure of
Discourse: Facing up to the Power of Sellers, 28 Health Aff. 1305, 1306 (2009); Bruce C. Vladeck,
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asymmetries where price and quality information are virtually
undiscoverable to patients; noncompetitive markets in which providers
with market power charge supracompetitive, monopoly prices; moral
hazard created by third-party financing of health care; principal-agent
problems arising from the web of intermediaries standing between a
patient and her health care; and financial and health-related externalities
from unmanageable medical debt that are borne by individuals and
society as a whole. Of these, the single most important factor driving our
health care pricing problem is a noncompetitive provider market.
The failure of the market for health care services invites regulatory
intervention, and there is an array of legal and policy solutions
policymakers may pursue to control health care prices and spending.
These solutions fall into several categories: (1) market solutions that focus
on consumerism, price competition, and transparency to discipline health
care prices; (2) antitrust enforcement to protect competition in the
provider market; (3) health care payment and delivery reforms that alter
financial incentives of providers to reduce overutilization and improve
efficiency; (4) consumer protections that protect financially vulnerable
patients from unconscionable prices and onerous debt collection practices;
and (5) rate regulation in the form of all-payer rate setting, price caps, or
global budgets.
Considerable scholarship from health law and policy literature, as
well as health economics, delve into the evaluation of some of these
approaches to solve our health care pricing and spending problem. The
literature, however, reflects the fragmentation and complexity of our
14
health care system because each study tends to focus on individual
15
solutions in isolation, such as evaluations of health care price transparency,
16
recommendations for accountable care organizations (“ACOs”), critiques

Paradigm Lost: Provider Concentration and the Failure of Market Theory, 33 Health Aff. 1083, 1083
(2014).
14. See, e.g., The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions 3–6 (Einer
Elhauge ed., 2010).
15. See David Cutler & Leemore Dafny, Designing Transparency Systems for Medical Care
Prices, 364 N. Eng. J. Med. 894 (2011); Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price
Transparency Reduce Healthcare Spending?, 4 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 319 (2013); Anna D. Sinaiko &
Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Health Care – Challenges and Potential
Effects, 364 N. Eng. J. Med. 891 (2013); Andrew Steinmetz & Ezekiel Emanuel, What Does a Hip
Replacement Cost? The Transparency Imperative in 2013, 173 JAMA Internal Med. 432 (2013); Peter
A. Ubel, Can Patients in the United States Become Savvy Health Care Consumers?, 92 N.C. L. Rev.
1749 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Rudy Douven et al., Avoiding Unintended Incentives in ACO Payment Models, 34
Health Aff. 143, 143–47 (2015); see Elliott S. Fisher et al., A Framework for Evaluating the
Formation, Implementation, and Performance of Accountable Care Organizations, 31 Health Aff.
2368 (2012); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and
Competition Policy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2014).
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17

of health care antitrust enforcement, or analysis of contract-based
18
approaches to control health care prices.
This Article is the first to consider all the policy approaches
simultaneously and comprehensively, using one overarching analytic
framework. Using this framework, this Article systematically evaluates
the viability of each of the policy solutions to discipline health care prices
by assessing the degree to which each strategy addresses the various
health care market failures. This policy-against-market-failure approach
reveals each policy’s relative strengths and blind spots, and the
comprehensive consideration of all of the approaches together tells a
story of a dynamic system where fixing one market failure may exacerbate
others, and ultimately undermine the goals of restraining health care
prices and spending. It is critical for policymakers to consider the dynamic
interplay between the different market failures and menu of solutions to
craft a legal or policy approach that actually has a chance of correcting a
failed market of the size, complexity, and importance of the U.S. health
care system.
In applying the policy-against-market-failure framework, this
Article accepts each of the legal and policy solutions to control health
care prices on its merits, construing each solution in a light most
favorable to the proponents who typically advance the policy. The
conclusions from the analysis are sobering. When evaluating the strategies
to control health care prices for their ability to address market failures, all
except rate regulation fall short when applied to noncompetitive health
care provider markets. In particular, the policy approaches that are most
politically popularmarket approaches and payment and delivery
reformswill not control health care prices in concentrated markets. For
the increasing preponderance of noncompetitive health care provider
markets, the only policy capable of addressing the market power of
providers is rate regulation, because no amount of competitive pressure
will create choices for consumers where none exist. The primary conclusion
of this analysis is that for the vast majority of jurisdictions with concentrated
provider markets, health care rate regulation must be a central part of any

17. David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310
JAMA 1964, 196869 (2013); Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital
Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 Am. J.L. & Med. 191, 192200 (1997); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak
Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 Or. L. Rev. 847, 86871 (2011); Barak
D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121,
140–48 (2007).
18. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New
Medical Marketplace, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (2008); Barak D. Richman et al., Overbilling and
Informed Financial Consent — A Contractual Solution, 367 N. Eng. J. Med. 396 (2012); Carl E.
Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care? 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 7
(2009).
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policy strategy to control health care spending. The analytic framework
and this conclusion are summarized visually in Figure 1, set forth below.
Figure 1: Policy Solutions Measured Against
Health Care Market Failures
Market
Solutions
Market
Imperfection

(CDHC,
transparency,
reference
pricing,
tiering)

Information

Market

Moral
Hazard

Agent

Externalities

(but cannot
address
extant
monopoly)

(increases
concentration)

--

--

--

--

--

--

Consumer
Protections

Rate
Regulation

(contract
enforcement,
fair pricing
laws)

(all-payer rate
setting, global
budgets, caps
on prices)

--

--

--

Concentrated

Principal-

(ACOs,
bundling)

--

Asymmetry

Monopoly/

Antitrust

Payment &
Delivery
Reforms

--

--

--

--

--

--

The second conclusion from this policy-against-market-failure analysis
is that no single solution or approach is sufficient to address all the market
failures, and a combination of approaches is necessary to correct the
manifold health care market imperfections. What this means is that for
noncompetitive provider markets, rate regulation should be augmented by
payment and delivery reforms, because rate setting alone will not address
the principal-agent problem of demand inducement by physicians and
overutilization of health care. Noncompetitive markets could also benefit
from the infusion of market forces to reward high-quality and high-value
hospitals and ensure adequacy of supply of needed services.
Part I describes the failures of the market for health care services.
Part II sets forth the range of legal and policy solutions typically offered
to discipline health care costs, and uses the policy-against-market-failure
framework to evaluate each solution for its effectiveness at addressing
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the various market failures. Part III then discusses the main conclusions
from the comprehensive analysis and implications for choosing which
policy solutions to deploy in a particular health care market to discipline
prices in that market.

I. Health Care Prices and Market Failure
Health care prices in the United States are excessive and inexplicable,
and they matter tremendously to any effort to control our health care
spending. Health care spending consumes more than seventeen percent
19
of our GDP. Inpatient and outpatient hospital prices are the largest
20
contributors to excess spending in U.S. health care. Moreover, high
prices are the main reason we spend so much more in the United States
for health care than other wealthy and developed countries, whether
21
measured per capita or as a percentage of the economy. For the higher
prices we pay, we do not get more or better quality care or better health
22
outcomes. Health care prices account for most of the growth in U.S. health
care spending, eclipsing the effects of increasing utilization, the aging or
sickness of the population, the supply of health care services, or
23
malpractice litigation and defensive medicine. Hospital prices are a key
driver of the larger health care pricing problem in the United States, and
the lack of market discipline of hospital prices is a prominent manifestation
of what is wrong with the health care market as a whole.
Evidence of the market failure for hospital services is borne out in
what we can observe of the unwarranted variations in hospital prices. In
a functioning market, price variations would relate to differences in costs,

19. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures 2013
Highlights (2013), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (noting that in 2013, national health
expenditures in the United States comprised 17.4% of the gross domestic product, totaling $2.9 trillion
or $9255 per person).
20. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 101; Lorenzoni et al., supra note 1, at 89 (“Higher health
sector prices explain much of the difference between the USA and other high-spending countries.”);
Diana Farrell et al., McKinsey Global Inst., Accounting for the Cost of US Health Care: A
New Look at Why Americans Spend More 1319, 21 (2008) (estimating, in 2008, that the United
States spends $650 billion more on health care than would be expected for a country with its wealth,
with inpatient and outpatient costs accounting for $476 billion, or seventy-three percent of the excess
spending).
21. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 103; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 130506.
22. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1306.
23. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 904 (“We conclude that supply constraints and waiting lists
do not appear to translate into significant savings in other countries and that malpractice and
defensive medicine are responsible for only a small portion of the U.S. spending differential.”); Moses
et al., supra note 4, at 1949 (“Between 2000 and 2011, increase in price (particularly of drugs, medical
devices, and hospital care), not intensity of service or demographic change, produced most of the
increase in health’s share of GDP.”).
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24

quality, the sickness of the population, or patient preferences. Instead,
variations in hospital prices are dictated by market power of the hospital,
not the hospital’s costs, payer mix, quality, or whether it is a teaching
25
hospital. Hospitals routinely engage in price discrimination, charging
26
different prices to different payers for the same service. Hospital price
discrimination is inefficient because the highest prices are charged to
those with the least bargaining power and ability to pay, such as the
uninsured or out-of-network patient. This health care price discrimination
differs from the price discrimination practices in other industries like
27
airlines or hotels, which are calibrated according to willingness to pay.
Indeed, the market for hospital services is rife with features of market
failure: information asymmetries, noncompetitive markets, moral hazard,
principal-agent problems, and externalities.
A. Information Asymmetry
The health care market overall, and the more limited market for
hospital services, are shot through with information asymmetries. Kenneth
Arrow famously identified information asymmetry in the form of
“uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment”
as the primary reason for the health care market’s departure from the
28
neoclassical competitive model. Health care information regarding
diagnosis or treatment options is so specialized, the theory goes, that the
patient lacks the information to assess the quality, cost, and nature of
29
health care necessary to make a purchasing choice.
The information asymmetry problem goes beyond assessing the
efficacy of a particular treatment. For hospital care, many informational
deficits accumulate: the patient typically lacks the clinical knowledge to
identify the items and services she will need; the price is nearly always
30
inaccessible until after the service is rendered; the quality of the hospital

24. Paul B. Ginsburg, Ctr. For Studying Health Sys. Change, Wide Variation in Hospital
and Physician Payment Rates Evidence of Provider Market Power 6 (2010).
25. See Massachusetts AG 2010 Report, supra note 10, at 3.
26. Uwe Reinhardt, Commentary, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed
Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 Health Aff. 2125,
212829 (2011).
27. N.J. Comm’n on Rationalizing Health Care Res., N.J. Dep’t of Health, Final Report
9293 (2008).
28. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ.
Rev. 941, 941 (1963).
29. See David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care
Markets, in 1B Handbook of Health Economics 1093, 1095 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P.
Newhouse eds., 2000).
30. Jaime Rosenthal et al., Availability of Consumer Prices from US Hospitals for Common
Surgical Procedure, 173 JAMA Internal Med. 427 (2013) (finding that only sixteen percent of
hospitals studied could provide a full price quote for a total hip replacement for a fictitious sixty-twoyear-old uninsured grandmother).
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and various clinicians involved in the care (such as experience and track
record or hospital error or infection rate) is notoriously difficult to
31
measure and compare; and patients rarely are aware of the financial
incentives for physicians involved in their care to order certain items or
32
services or refer to particular providers. All of this information would be
necessary for a patient to make informed health care decisions.
Patients simply have inadequate information about the substance,
quality, cost, and provider incentives to make informed choices about
consuming hospital services. Information asymmetry with high search costs
continues to drive market failure for hospital services.
B. Noncompetitive Provider Markets
Monopolies and excessive market power are another type of market
33
failure that plagues health care provider markets. Loss of competition in
health care is probably the most important driver of our health care pricing
problem. Hospital markets in the United States are highly concentrated and
34
are getting increasingly noncompetitive. To measure the competitiveness
of a given health care market, antitrust agencies and economists use the
35
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). Under this measure, half of all
hospital markets in the United States are considered highly concentrated,
36
and no hospital market is highly competitive. The vast majority of large
metropolitan areas in the United States have a highly concentrated hospital
37
market, meaning most of the population lives in a noncompetitive market.
The problem is worse in many rural areas, where hospitals have few if
38
any competitors. The typical hospital market is noncompetitive: it has
one dominant hospital system and two to three smaller systems that

31. Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 6566 (noting that information on price and quality are rarely
available to the patient).
32. Greaney, supra note 13, at 864.
33. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1306.
34. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966.
35. HHI is the sum of the squared market share of each hospital or hospital system in a given
market multiplied by 10,000. Market share is calculated as proportional share of inpatient admissions
or patient days possessed by a hospital relative the rest of the market. Thus, a market with only one
hospital (a pure monopoly) would have an HHI of 10,000 and a market with two hospitals (a duopoly)
would have an HHI of 5000. Typically, a market is considered “highly concentrated” if the HHI is
greater than 2500, which means there are about four equal sized hospital owners in a given market. A
market is “moderately concentrated” if its HHI is between 1500 and 2500. Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, U.S. Dep’t of Just., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html (last updated July 29,
2015).
36. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966.
37. Stephen Zuckerman & John Holahan, Urban Inst. Health Policy Ctr., Despite Criticism,
The Affordable Care Act Does Much to Contain Costs 2 (2012), http://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412665-Despite-Criticism-The-Affordable-Care-Act-DoesMuch-to-Contain-Health-Care-Costs.PDF (noting that as of the mid-2000s, eighty-eight percent of
hospital markets in large metropolitan areas is highly concentrated).
38. See Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 3.
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together account for a large preponderance of hospital admissions in the
39
area. The concentration of hospital markets has been increasing over
time, with an ongoing wave of hospital mergers resulting in horizontal
concentration, and hospital acquisitions of physician groups resulting in
40
vertical integration.
The excessive concentration found in the provider market drives up
41
prices to supracompetitive levels. Empirical studies have demonstrated
that increasing concentration in hospital markets significantly raises hospital
42
prices, by some estimates as much as twenty percent to forty percent. In
concentrated markets, “must-have” hospitals have significantly more
bargaining power than health insurers because the health plan needs the
hospital to satisfy its individual and employer-customers and to provide
43
sufficient access to necessary services. Hospitals with market power can
resist health insurers’ pressures to constrain prices when they know the
44
insurer cannot walk away from the negotiation.
Hospital markets are also characterized with dramatic variations in
price. Within the same geographic area, there can be a sixty percent
difference between the highest and lowest priced hospitals for the same
45
inpatient services, and a twofold difference in prices for outpatient services.
Price variations in the hospital market are driven largely by differences in
market share and cannot be explained by differences in the hospitals’
costs, quality, the sickness of the patients, or whether the hospital is an

39. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966.
40. Id. (“The extent of hospital concentration has increased over time. The hospital HHI has
increased by [forty percent] since the mid-1980s, changing from a market with on average [five]
independent firms (there were [more than five] independent hospitals, but approximately [five] major
ones) to a market with approximately [three] independent firms.”).
41. Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, Robert Wood Johnson Found., The Impact of Hospital
ConsolidationUpdate 1 (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/
rwjf73261; Glenn A. Melnick, Yu-Chu Shen & Vivian Yaling Wu, The Increased Concentration of
Health Plan Markets Can Benefit Consumers Through Lower Hospital Prices, 30 Health Aff. 1728,
1731 (2011).
42. Gaynor & Town, supra note 41, at 2 (“The magnitude of price increases when hospitals
merge in concentrated markets is typically quite large, most exceeding 20 percent.”); Martin Gaynor,
Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and Policy Maze, 33 Health
Aff. 1088, 1089 (2014) (“Hospital mergers that create a dominant system can lead to very large price
increases, even as high as 40–50 percent.”); Leemore S. Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger
Effects: An Application to Hospital Mergers, 52 J.L. & Econ. 523, 544 (2009).
43. Chapin White, Amelia M. Bond & James D. Reschovsky, Ctr. For Studying Health Sys.
Change, High and Varying Prices for Privately Insured Patients Underscore Hospital Market
Power 2 (2013), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1375/1375.pdf; Robert A. Berenson et al., The
Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy
Remedies May Be Needed, 31 Health Aff. 973, 973 (2012).
44. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 Health Aff. 699, 702 (2010).
45. White et al., supra note 43, at 4.
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46

academic medical center. In other words, when we pay more at a highprice hospital, we are not getting more or better care. Rather, we are
47
simply paying for the hospital’s monopoly rents.
Barriers to entry for new competitors exacerbate the problem of
hospital market concentration. State certificate of need (“CON”) laws
were originally designed to control supply of health care services in an
48
effort to control spending. However, CON laws pose barriers to entry,
49
making it difficult or impossible for new competitors to enter a market.
50
CON laws persist in more than two-thirds of states, but even in states
without CON laws, state licensure, accreditation, and certification to
participate in Medicare and Medicaid, make it difficult for competitors to
51
enter the market. It is much easier for an existing hospital to buy up and
merge with its competitors than it is to open a new hospital.
The current landscape reveals a hospital market that is highly
concentrated and trending toward more consolidation of market power
among the large hospital systems. Although localities vary in their degree
of concentration, in most of the United States, hospital markets are
failing due to a lack of competition.
C. Moral Hazard and Third Party Payment
The uncertainty of illness or accident and the expense of acute
medical care leads most people to finance their health care through third
52
party insurance. The presence of the third party payer can lead to moral
hazard, another feature of market failure, where individuals consume
more health care than they would if they had to bear the full costs of
53
health care. Even if an individual knows her excess use of health care

46. Massachusetts AG 2010 Report, supra note 10, at 2; Joseph P. Newhouse & Alan M.
Garber, Geographic Variation in Health Care Spending in the United States: Insights from an Institute
of Medicine Report, 310 JAMA 1227, 122728 (2013) (“[P]rice variation is responsible for an estimated
70% of the total geographic variation in spending among privately insured persons. Variation in wage
levels and variation in the quantity of services delivered are almost equally responsible for the
remaining estimated 30% of spending variation.”).
47. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Profits Without Production, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/opinion/krugman-profits-without-production.html (defining monopoly
rents as “profits that don’t represent returns on investment, but instead reflect the value of market
dominance”).
48. Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx#Program (last visited Dec.
18, 2015).
49. Gaynor, supra note 42, at 109091; William M. Sage, Getting the Product Right: How
Competition Policy Can Improve Health Care Markets, 33 Health Aff. 1076, 1080 (2014).
50. Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, supra note 48 (identifying, as of 2011,
thirty-six states with active CON law or program, twenty-eight of which regulate acute hospital beds).
51. See Greaney, supra note 13, at 865; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1307.
52. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 945.
53. See Mark Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531, 53335
(1968).
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services will result in increased health insurance premiums, the
magnitude of her gain from the additional services is greater than the
54
premium increase, which is spread across all policyholders. The tax
subsidy that employers receive to provide health insurance for
employees exacerbates this moral hazard by allowing more insurance to
55
be purchased than would be with after-tax dollars. One correction to
moral hazard is to impose price rationing at the point of service in the
form of individual cost-sharing through copays, coinsurance, or
56
deductibles.
In the case of hospital care, it is particularly difficult to strike the
balance between the overconsumption from moral hazard and
underconsumption of necessary care by those who cannot afford it. Most
hospital stays are so expensive that even modest coinsurance rates can
make hospital care unaffordable to most people, which may be one
reason the Affordable Care Act places a limit on annual out-of-pocket
57
expenses. Because hospital treatment is so expensive, it is likely to
exceed an individual’s annual deductible and the statutory out-of-pocket
limit, which protects the patient from financial risk, but makes her
58
insensitive to hospital costs above the deductible. Health insurance may
also exacerbate the market failure from hospital monopoliesby
shielding individuals from prices, insurance allows monopolist hospitals
to charge even more than the price that would be enabled by the
59
monopoly.
Some have questioned the degree to which moral hazard produces
60
inefficiency in health care. In the case of treatment for serious illness
characteristic of acute hospital care, it is far from clear how much
61
additional health care is consumed because of insurance coverage.
Almost no one would elect to undergo unnecessary major surgery simply

54. Id. at 534.
55. See Mark Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy,
24 J. Econ. Lit. 629, 641 (1986).
56. See Joseph P. Newhouse & The Insurance Experiment Group, Free for All? Lessons from
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 4042 (1986); Pauly, supra note 53, at 534.
57. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(2010); see also
Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security after the Affordable Care Act,
92 N.C. L. Rev. 101, 121 (2014).
58. Ann Tynan et al., Ctr. For Studying Health Sys. Change, A Health Plan Work in
Progress: Hospital-Physician Price and Quality Transparency 7 (2008); James C. Robinson &
Kimberly MacPherson, Payers Test Reference Pricing and Centers of Excellence to Steer Patients to
Low-Price and High-Quality Providers, 31 Health Aff. 2028, 2029 (2012).
59. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 17, at 863.
60. John A. Nyman, Is Moral Hazard Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New Theory,
23 Health Aff. 194, 196 (2004).
61. Id. Contrast this with the known waste and welfare loss that results from excess care that is
ordered because of principal-agent problems, discussed infra in Part I.D.
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62

because insurance covers it. Thus, cost-sharing strategies to control
health care prices by targeting moral hazard may have reduced value or
effect, especially for hospital services. Nevertheless, the existence of
third-party financing does make individuals less sensitive to price
differences among hospitals or providers, which dampens incentives for
providers to compete on price.
In sum, hospital prices are so high that we need insurance to finance
even ordinary hospital services, but the presence of insurance creates
moral hazard by shielding patients from the costs of their own care and
making them insensitive to price signals. Consumers who are insensitive
to price are less likely to impose market pressure on hospitals to
constrain costs or prices. In this manner, moral hazard contributes to the
market failure for health care services. However, as among the various
health care market failures, moral hazard may be a less serious problem
than others, such as provider monopolies, information asymmetry, or
principal-agent problems.
D. Principal-Agent Problems
Hospital markets also suffer from principal-agent problems. Agency
problems lead to inefficient economic results when the agent makes
decisions on behalf of the principal, but the agent’s interests are misaligned
63
with that of the principal. Tim Greaney described the “triple-agency”
problem that arises between the patient, physician, and payer in many
64
health care transactions. For hospital services, the hospital is yet
another party, creating a quadruple-agency web of relations between the
hospital, physician(s), patient, and payer. Worse, for most nonelderly
patients in the United States, there is a quintuple-agency relationship,
when you add the employer who purchases the insurance on behalf of
the individual.
The classic principal-agent relationship in health care is the
65
physician-patient relationship. It is well-documented that physicians’
medical decisions on behalf of their patients are often influenced by
financial incentives, practice habits, and norms that may be at odds with

62. Id. at 19798 (“[F]ew if any people would frivolously choose to endure coronary bypass
surgery just because the price had dropped to zero. Therefore, imposing any coinsurance payment (let
alone a 50 percent copayment) on the patient with coronary heart disease to limit . . . her purchases of
bypass procedures simply does not make sense. Insurance contracts should be restructured so that this
type of care is completely covered.”).
63. Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital Competition, and
Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 117, 120
(1994).
64. Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics
Perspective, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1189, 1191 (2009).
65. Pautler & Vita, supra note 63, at 120; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 130607.
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66

the patients’ interests in obtaining the appropriate care at the right price.
Physicians have legal and ethical obligations to put their patient’s interests
first, but they have a difficult time ascertaining what the patient’s
67
interests are. And even though cost is a significant concern to many
patients, physicians generally do not know the price of the items and
services they prescribe, so they cannot guide a patient to a cost-effective
68
choice.
In the context of hospital services, the physician often stands
between the patient and the hospital, being the one to order as well as
perform the hospital service. Physicians drive demand for services, such
that it is often quipped that the most expensive piece of equipment in the
69
hospital is the doctor’s pen. The principal-agent problem between the
physician and the patient is exacerbated by the incentives created by the
way we pay for health care, which generally rewards ordering more
70
services and more complex, highly paid services. Thus, the practical
manifestation of the principal-agent problem in health care is a push
toward overutilization of health care.
The physician may be both the agent of the hospital (as an
employee or contractor) and of the patient, with misaligned incentives
existing between all three. For example, Medicare’s differing payment
methodologies for hospitals (based on a lump sum payment) and
physicians (based on fee-for-service) creates an inherent tension between
71
providing less care or more care. Nevertheless, hospitals need
physicians to maintain their business, both to perform services and to
drive patient volume through referrals. To attract a physician’s “book of
business,” hospitals bend over backwards to attract and curry favor with
physicians, often competing for physician referrals more than they

66. See Greaney, supra note 64, at 11991200.
67. See E. Haavi Morreim, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Alternative Medicine, Conventional
Medicine, and the Standards of Science, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 222, 22225 (2003).
68. See Kanu Okike et al., Survey Finds that Few Orthopedic Surgeons Know the Cost of the
Devices They Implant, 33 Health Aff. 103, 103 (2014).
69. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, New Yorker, June 1, 2009, at 36, 43 (“Healthcare costs ultimately arise from the accumulation of individual decisions doctors make about which
services and treatments to write an order for. The most expensive piece of medical equipment, as the
saying goes, is a doctor’s pen.”).
70. See, e.g., Robert Murray, Maryland’s Bold Experiment in Reversing Fee-for-Service Incentives,
Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 28, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/28/marylands-bold-experimentin-reversing-fee-for-service-incentives/.
71. For inpatient care, Medicare pays hospitals a lump sum payment based on diagnosis under the
Medicare Severity-Adjusted Diagnostic Related Group (“MS-DRG”), which puts financial pressure
on the hospital to use fewer resources and discharge the patient sooner for a given admission. The
physicians who perform the “professional component” of the hospital services are separately paid on a
fee-for-service basis, which provides incentives to order more tests and services. See Fuse Brown,
supra note 7, at 56; Greaney, supra note 16, at 15; Uwe E. Reinhardt, How Medicare Sets Hospital
Prices: A Primer, N.Y. Times Economix (Nov. 26, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/11/26/how-medicare-sets-hospital-prices-a-primer/.
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compete on price through generous compensation and upgrades in
72
equipment and facilities. The patient’s interests and values are quickly
lost in the complicated forces and powerful interests pushing care
73
decisions.
Further complicating this web of agency relationships are the payers
and employer-purchasers of health insurance. Just as the patient relies on
the physician to make diagnostic and treatment decisions, the patient
also relies on the third-party payer to negotiate prices with the provider
74
and evaluate provider price and quality. The interests of the health
insurance plan, attracting customers, and ensuring medical claims do not
75
exceed premium revenue, often run against those of the patient-enrollee.
And for the majority of nonelderly Americans, the employer acts further
as an agent by purchasing health insurance for employees. The employer
has dampened incentives to bargain aggressively with providers because
of the employer’s ability to pass on higher prices to employees in the
76
form of reduced wages and higher premiums. Each agent has
incomplete information about the patient’s preferences and has financial
incentives that may be contrary to the interests of the patient.
The quadruple or quintuple-agency problem creates barriers to
efficient purchasing and selling of hospital services. It is nearly
impossible for the patient’s interests to be served effectively when
hospitals view physicians and payers, not patients, as their primary

72. United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(“Traditionally, hospitals competed on the basis of their attractiveness to physicians. Hospitals
recognized that, in most cases, physicians controlled inpatient admissions to hospitals. Consequently,
attracting competent physicians became a means to maintain and expand inpatient admissions.”),
aff’d, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market
Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 849,
86465 (2000).
73. See, e.g., Albert G. Mulley et al., Stop the Silent Misdiagnosis: Patients’ Preferences Matter,
345 BMJ 6572 (2012) (describing the problem of misdiagnosis of patient preferences and values in
treatment, which leads to excess provision of unwanted treatment).
74. See Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, 26 Health Aff. w208, w209 (2007);
Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 61.
75. See C. Paul Wazzan et al., An Economic Analysis of the Impact of Pay-for-Performance
Initiatives on Physicians, Patients and Insurance Providers, 3 Ind. Health L. Rev. 357, 358 (2006).
76. Gaynor, supra note 42, at 1089 (“[P]rice increases by hospitals are fully passed through to
consumers. When prices go up, health insurance premiums go up. When premiums go up, employers
simply reduce workers’ total compensation dollar for dollar by the amount of the premium increase.
This can come in the form of lower pay; increased cost-sharing for premiums; or lower benefits,
including dropping coverage entirely in some cases.”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Culprit Behind High
U.S. Health Care Prices, N.Y. Times: Economix (June 7, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/06/07/the-culprit-behind-high-u-s-health-care-prices/ (“One reason for the
employers’ passivity in paying health care bills may be that they know, or should know, that the fringe
benefits they purchase for their employees ultimately come out of the employees’ total pay package.
In a sense, employers behave like pickpockets who take from their employees’ wallets and with the
money lifted purchase goodies for their employees.”).
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77

customers, because physicians and payers drive demand for their services.
Hospitals then make pricing and economic decisions to maximize
78
bargaining leverage over health plans. As a result, information about
price and product are communicated in a way that is impenetrable to the
patient, spoken in the disaggregated and incomprehensible language of
79
80
CPT codes, DRGs, case rates, per diems, facility fees, and professional
81
components. For every hospital interaction, the patient may be
represented simultaneously and imperfectly by multiple physicians, the
health insurer, and employer, and the patient’s interests quickly get lost
in the complicated web of quadruple or quintuple-agency relationships.
The principal-agent problems in health care are interrelated with
both moral hazard and information asymmetry. A person may consume
more health care than he would if he were bearing the full cost of the
services because the decision to order the services is made by an agent
(the physician). Moreover, there is substantial information asymmetry
between the principals and agents in health care. An easy example is that
the physician might happen to know that an alternative item or service
might be similarly effective, but does not tell the patient that the
physician has a greater financial incentive to recommend one choice over
another. These types of market failures are best thought of as conceptual
overlapping categories rather than as crisply defined phenomena.
However, it remains useful to think about principal-agent problems in
health care as its own category, because the policy interventions to
address them may be different than those that address moral hazard or
imperfect information.

77. Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-Price
Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 727, 734 (1999) (describing hospital
competition for loyalty of physicians for referrals or payers for volume of patients, because both
physicians and payers are sources of demand for hospital services).
78. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 78485 (describing hospitals’ incentives to inflate charges,
including to improve negotiating power against health plans); Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 976.
79. CPT codes, or Current Procedural Terminology, are “the most widely accepted medical
nomenclature used to report medical procedures and services under public and private health
insurance programs.” About CPT®, Am. Med. Ass’n, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/cpt/about-cpt.page? (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015).
80. DRGs, or Diagnosis-Related Groups, refers to a payment classification system that groups
similar clinical conditions by diagnosis and includes all procedures furnished by the hospital during the
inpatient stay. Hospitals are paid a fixed rate for all inpatient services according to the DRG assigned
to the patient, adjusted for severity and comorbid conditions. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(2013), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/
downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf.
81. See Sage, supra note 49, at 107778.
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E. Externalities of Irrational Hospital Prices
Elsewhere I have written about the externalities of our current
hospital pricing system: the harms imposed on individuals who face
82
unaffordable and incomprehensible hospital bills. Though hospitals may
believe they internalize the costs of uncompensated care by shifting these
costs to other payers, there are many costs externalized by the hospital to
individual patients and society as a whole. The externalities of excessive
hospital prices and harsh debt collection practices include the costs of
personal bankruptcy, home foreclosure, wages garnished, legal fees and
interest paid, loss of creditworthiness, and self-rationing of necessary
83
items like food, shelter, or medical care.
Hospital bills are often unaffordably high, especially for the
84
uninsured or underinsured individual. When a person cannot pay his or
her hospital bill, the hospital typically uses aggressive debt collection
practices to pursue the debt, including reporting the debt to credit
agencies, seeking garnishment of wages, placing a lien on or seeking
foreclosure on the patient’s home, or assigning the debt to collection
85
agencies that use harsh tactics to hound a person to pay the debt. Even
if the hospital ultimately only collects a small fraction of the debt, the
patients suffer significant financial and health-related costs from having
86
an unpaid hospital debt. The externalities of irrational hospital prices
affect a broad range of patients and are not just a problem for the
87
uninsured. In a 2012 survey, forty-one percent of adults aged nineteen
to sixty-four reported they had trouble paying off medical debt, and of

82. See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 40.
83. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 12, at 548 (estimating that about forty-six percent of
personal bankruptcy filers had self-identified a medical reason for their bankruptcy); Melissa B.
Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 453, 477
(2004); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10
Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 239, 247 (2010); Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 979, 100608 (2012); Robertson et al., supra note 12, at 6668 (concluding from survey
data that forty-nine percent of home foreclosures were caused in part by a medical problem, and
twenty-three percent were caused by unmanageable medical bills).
84. See Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 62.
85. See, e.g., Marsha Austin, Uninsured Pay Higher Price: Hospital Collection Agents Demand
Full Cost of Care, Den. Post, Jan. 28, 2003, at 1A (noting that hospitals in the Denver area have sued
at least 210 individuals for unpaid bills); Cullen Browder, Wake Woman May Lose Home to Cover
Late Husband’s Medical Bills, WRAL.com (July 12, 2004), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/
112201/; Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital Using Liens to Collect from Patients, Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 2004, at
A1; Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still PayingJeanette White Is Long Dead but Her Hospital
Bill Lives On, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at B1; Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your
Credit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2014, at SR.4.
86. Hospitals typically only recover about ten percent of the bill from self-pay patients. See A
RelayHealth White Paper: Improving Self Pay at All Points of Service, RelayHealth 8 (2010), http://
ndha.org/image/cache/ImprovingSelf-PayAtAllPointsofService_RelayHealth__2_.pdf; Anderson, supra
note 11, at 787.
87. See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 4151.

H - Fuse Brown_26 (Hamilton12.7) (Do Not Delete)

December 2015]

12/15/2015 6:00 PM

RESURRECTING HEALTH CARE RATE REGULATION

103

those reporting difficulty with medical debt, forty-two percent (or
approximately thirty-two million people) reported lower credit ratings as
88
a result.
Health care markets are replete with forms of market failure. Like a
textbook example, the U.S. hospital market exhibits the types of
information asymmetries, market concentration, moral hazard, principalagent problems, and externalities that interfere with a market’s efficient
and effective functioning.
II. Policy Solutions Evaluated Against Market Failures
The type of market failure and magnitude seen in the health care
market invites a regulatory solution. This Part describes the variety of
legal and policy solutions generally put forth to discipline health care
prices: (1) market solutions, including transparency and other efforts to
heighten the consumer behavior of patients to discipline prices through
competition; (2) antitrust enforcement to protect competition in the
hospital market; (3) payment and delivery reforms, such as accountable
care organizations or bundled payments that aim to control health care
costs through improved care coordination and aligned provider financial
incentives; (4) consumer protection solutions where courts use tools from
contract law or consumer protection statutes to protect vulnerable
patients from the extremes of hospital pricing; and (5) rate regulation in
the form of all-payer rate setting, price caps, or global budgets.
Part II uses an analytic framework to evaluate each policy approach
to controlling health care prices by measuring the policy for its
effectiveness at addressing the various market failures identified in
Part I. This policy solution-against-market-failure approach reveals much
about the strengths, weaknesses, and blind spots of each proposed
solution and allows policymakers to select the policy approaches that will
have the best chance of controlling health care prices, and therefore,
health care spending. A depiction of this analytic framework and its
89
conclusions is set forth in Figure 1.
A. Market Solutions
Market solutions are the most popular solutions among health
policymakers to address the problem of excess and wildly variable health
90
care prices. Market solutions include price transparency, consumer88. Sara Collins et al., Commonwealth Fund, Insuring the Future: Current Trends in Health
Coverage and the Effects of Implementing the Affordable Care Act xii (2013), http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2013/Apr/1681_Collins_insuring_
future_biennial_survey_2012_FINAL.pdf.
89. See supra Figure 1.
90. Meredith Rosenthal & Norman Daniels, Beyond Competition: The Normative Implications of
Consumer-Driven Health Plans, 31 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 671, 671 (2006).
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directed health care, reference pricing, and tiered or narrow networks, and
they rely on competition and market forces to reduce price variations and
to scale prices to reflect value.
1.

Price Transparency

Price transparency promotes the notion that health care purchasers,
whether individuals or employers, ought to be able to find and compare
the price of a given service between hospitals. Price transparency has
broad political and intuitive appeal by attempting to lift the veil of
91
secrecy that shrouds hospital prices. So the argument goes, consumers
need access to accurate, understandable, and comparable information
regarding hospital price and quality for market forces to discipline prices
92
and improve quality. Armed with such information, consumers will
shop for health care and select the lower cost, higher quality providers
93
and pressure the others to bring their prices and quality levels in line.
Health care price transparency initiatives are being pursued at both
the state and federal levels. A majority of states have passed some form
94
of legislation to improve hospital price transparency. According to 2014
data from the Catalyst for Payment Reform, thirty-five states only
95
require that hospitals post or make available their chargemaster data;
fifteen states require the reporting of the prices hospitals receive from
private payers, whether actual claims data or average amounts paid
96
(several of which also require reporting of chargemaster data); and two
states (New Hampshire and Massachusetts) make available more
97
detailed, plan-specific price information. At the federal level, the
Department of Health and Human Services initiated its price transparency
efforts by releasing hospital charge data on May 8, 2013, updated annually,

91. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894.
92. Steinmetz & Emanuel, supra note 15, at 433.
93. Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 892.
94. Catalyst for Payment Reform & Health Care Incentives Improvement Inst., Report Card
on State Price Transparency Laws 9–16 (2014), http://www.hci3.org/sites/default/files/files/Report_
PriceTransLaws_2014.pdf; see also Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 891.
95. Catalyst for Payment Reform, supra note 94, at 9–16. These states include: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
96. Id. These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
97. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6A, § 16K (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 228 (2014); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 420-G:11, 420-G:11-a (2006).
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and making available $87 million in grants to states to create data centers
98
to collect and analyze health care pricing information for consumers.
For transparency efforts, the type of data matters. Publishing
99
chargemaster prices does little to accomplish price transparency.
Chargemasters are too long and incomprehensible to be useful and do
not reflect the prices that the majority of individuals with insurance
100
would pay. Average prices negotiated by payers gives a better sense of
the relative price differences between hospitals actually paid by health
plans in the aggregate, but it does not give an individual a sense of how
much she might pay with her particular health plan or the range in prices
negotiated by different health plans. Plan-specific data or estimates of a
patient’s expected out-of-pocket costs are more helpful for consumers to
get a sense of what their actual costs might be, but still may fall short if
not accompanied by robust quality data, which is much more difficult to
101
measure. Most consumers do not want cheaper health care if it is of
poorer quality, and without good quality data, patients often assume
102
(incorrectly) that price is a proxy for quality.
It is far from clear whether consumers will use available price and
quality data information to make their treatment choices. Generally, the
more complex the information, the less consumers utilize it. For
example, price information ought to be provided about the whole bundle
of services associated with an episode of care rather than a disaggregated
103
list of coded, a la carte items, as hospital services are often priced.
Earlier efforts at health plan price transparency using easy-to-read
symbols ($ vs. $$$) were abandoned due to little consumer use and
104
pressure from low-price providers to increase prices. If the patient is
shielded from price differences because she has exceeded her deductible,

98. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Administration Offers Consumers
Unprecedented Look at Hospital Charges (May 8, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2013-Press-releases-items/2013-05-08.html?DLPage=3&DLEntries=
10&DLSort=0&DLSortDir=ascending; Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact
Sheet: HHS Releases Hospital Data on Charge Variation to Promote Transparency (May 8, 2013),
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2013-Fact-Sheets-Items/2013-0508.html.
99. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 786. A chargemaster is a master list of the hospital’s
undiscounted or full charges, akin to retail list prices, for each of the tens of thousands of items,
services, and procedures it provides. Allen Dobson et al., Lewin Group, A Study of Hospital
Charge Setting Practices 1 (2005).
100. David Dranove, The Rest of the Story About Hospital Pricing, Health Care Blog (May 9, 2013),
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/05/09/the-rest-of-the-story-about-hospital-pricing/#more-61521; Muir
et al., supra note 15, at 32629.
101. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 786.
102. See Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 892.
103. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w211.
104. Id. at w213.
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then she has little incentive to choose a hospital based on price
information.
Price transparency, though politically popular, has a couple of major
pitfalls. First, disclosure of prices does not solve the market failures
created by noncompetitive hospital markets. Despite having among the
most robust price transparency laws in the country, New Hampshire has
105
not seen a measurable reduction in hospital prices or price variation.
There, price transparency has not been able to overcome the tidal force
106
of a noncompetitive hospital market. Where hospitals do not compete
on price, transparency does little to constrain prices. Large, “must-have”
hospitals can still command high prices without losing patient volume
where patients and payers have few alternatives.
The second pitfall is that widespread price transparency may lead
107
paradoxically to higher rather than lower hospital prices. In particular,
revelation of the prices that commercial health plans actually pay
hospitalsthe data most helpful for patientscould create a perverse
108
incentive for hospitals to raise their prices. To illustrate, imagine
Hospital A offers a significant discount to Insurer 1 and a smaller
discount to Insurer 2. If forced to reveal its prices, Hospital A might be
unwilling to offer the deeper discount to Insurer 1, knowing that
109
Insurer 2 will likely pressure it to offer the same discount. This
tendency is exacerbated where the hospitals have greater bargaining
110
power than the health plans, which is true in most provider markets. In
these markets, a lower-priced Hospital B may raise its prices once it sees
what Hospital A is charging because the health plans lack the power to
111
keep Hospital B’s prices in check. Especially in less competitive
markets, price transparency might create a magnetic ceiling, where all
112
hospitals converge on higher prices rather than compete to lower them.
Hence, prices might become more uniform, but uniformly higher.

105. Ha T. Tu & Johanna R. Lauer, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Impact of Health
Care Price Transparency on Price Variation: The New Hampshire Experience 1 (2009).
106. Id. at 2.
107. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894.
108. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w214 (citing a Danish study of the pricing behavior of
concrete producers in a concentrated market. Following implementation price transparency policies,
the companies raised prices fifteen to twenty percent because of the loss of the ability to offer secret
discounts to buyers).
109. See id.; Margaret K. Kyle & David B. Ridley, Would Greater Transparency And Uniformity
Of Health Care Prices Benefit Poor Patients?, 26 Health Aff. 1384, 1388 (2007).
110. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894.
111. Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 893.
112. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894; Kyle & Ridley, supra note 109, at 1388.
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Consumer-Directed Health Care

Consumer-directed health care (“CDHC”) is another market-based
approach that builds off of price transparency. The typical mechanism to
encourage CDHC is through a high deductible health plan coupled with
113
a tax-advantaged health savings account (“HSA”). By giving patients
some “skin in the game,” CDHC sensitizes patients to health care costs,
which leads the patient to exert market pressure on providers to move
114
toward more uniform prices. CDHC attempts to address the moral
hazard problem of health insurance by forcing the insured individual to
bear the initial cost of her health care expenditure, which will cause her
115
to ration her utilization of services.
In 2015, a plan is considered a high deductible plan if the deductible
116
is at least $1300 for an individual and $2600 for a family. Deductibles
117
vary widely, and over a third of family deductibles exceed $5000. The
use of high deductible plans is widespread and steadily increasing. In a
2014 survey of large employers, eighty-one percent reported offering a
CHDC plan to employees as an option, and thirty-two percent reported
offering a CDHC plan as the only option, up from twenty-five percent
118
the previous year. As of 2014, twenty percent of covered employees
were enrolled in a CDHC plan, compared with just four percent in
119
2006. On the health insurance exchanges, high deductible health plans
120
comprise approximately sixty percent to eighty percent of plans.
In the form of high deductible health plans, CDHC has a limited
impact on hospital prices because most hospital services will be so
expensive that a patient will “blow through” her deductible, and thus be
121
insensitive to price variations above the deductible. Carl Schneider and
Mark Hall identified several barriers to the goals of CDHC that prevent
122
patients from engaging in consumer behaviors. Patients may lack

113. See N.J. Dep’t of Health, supra note 27, at 99.
114. Gail R. Wilensky, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Early Evidence and Potential Impact on
Hospitals, 25 Health Aff. 174, 18384 (2006).
115. See Rosenthal & Daniels, supra note 90, at 672; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a
Bad Idea? The Consumer-Driven Perspective, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 377, 37879 (2008).
116. Rev. Proc. 2014-30, 2014-20 I.R.B. 1009.
117. Gary Claxton et al., Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits: 2014 Annual
Survey 158, Exhibit 8.11 (2014), http://kff.org/health-costs/report/2014-employer-health-benefitssurvey/.
118. Press Release, Nat’l Bus. Grp. on Health, U.S. Employers Changing Health Benefit Plans to
Control Rising Costs, Comply with ACA, National Business Group on Health Survey Finds (Aug. 13,
2014), http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID=234.
119. Claxton et al., supra note 117, at 154, Exhibit 8.5.
120. Bob Herman, High-Deductible Plans Dominate Next Open Enrollment, Modern Healthcare
(Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141113/NEWS/311139966.
121. See Tynan et al., supra note 58, at 4; Gail R. Wilensky, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Early
Evidence and Potential Impact on Hospitals, 25 Health Aff. 174, 182 (2006).
122. Schneider & Hall, supra note 18, at 15.
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123

choices among plans and providers. Moreover, despite efforts to
promote transparency, patients still lack necessary information about
124
price and quality. If they lack quality data, patients are likely to opt for
the higher-priced hospitals because of the mistaken perception that price
125
is a proxy for quality. Even with price information, patients are often
unable to bargain with the hospital, either because they will not or
cannot. Patients place themselves in their doctor’s hands, following
whatever advice the doctor prescribes, including at which hospital to
126
have a procedure performed. Acutely sick patients are in a particularly
vulnerable position, unable to negotiate on prices for urgently needed
care on the way to the emergency room or at the bedside of a gravely ill
127
family member. Empirical research has cast doubt on patients’ financial
literacy and ability to process the complex information necessary to
128
make health care choices.
Studies have demonstrated that higher cost-sharing has a
disproportionate, negative impact on the poor and those with chronic
129
illness, highlighting questions of distributive justice. Greater costsharing causes people to cut back not just on unnecessary care, but
130
needed care as well. Privately insured individuals with incomes below
200 percent of poverty are significantly more likely to have deductibles
that exceed five percent of their incomes and are more likely to delay
131
needed care as a result. When individuals defer cost-saving preventive
and outpatient care, they may later consume more expensive ER and
132
hospital services for poorly controlled illness. CDHC may contribute to
adverse selection, with healthier (and, evidence shows, wealthier and
more educated) individuals selecting a CDHC plan and sicker people

123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 2021.
125. Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 892.
126. Schneider & Hall, supra note 18, at 27.
127. Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 658.
128. Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w211; Greaney, supra note 64, at 11991200; Schneider & Hall,
supra note 18, at 3840.
129. See, e.g., Vicki Fung et al., Financial Barriers to Care Among Low-Income Children with
Asthma: Health Care Reform Implications, 168 JAMA Pediatrics 649, 650 (2014); Rosenthal &
Daniels, supra note 90, at 675, 679; Amal Trivedi et al., Increased Ambulatory Care Copayments and
Hospitalizations Among the Elderly, 362 N. Eng. J. Med. 320, 320 (2010). Policies can selectively
address the problem of the negative impact of cost-sharing on low-income populations. For example,
the Affordable Care Act subsidizes cost-sharing for low-income individuals purchasing plans on the
exchanges, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (2010), and requires certain preventive care to be covered without
cost-sharing, 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg-13 (2011).
130. See Newhouse & The Insurance Experiment Group, supra note 56, at 162.
131. Sara R. Collins et al., Commonwealth Fund, Too High a Price: Out-of-Pocket Health Care
Costs in the United States 45 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications
/issue-brief/2014/nov/1784_collins_too_high_a_price_out_of_pocket_tb_v2.pdf.
132. See Fung, supra note 129, at 652; Trivedi, supra note 129, at 321.
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133

opting for plans with lower deductibles. Meredith Rosenthal and
Norman Daniels explain that among employer-sponsored high-deductible
health plans with HSAs, the employer contribution to the HSA tends to
134
redistribute wealth from the unhealthy to the healthy.
3.

Reference Pricing

Like high deductibles, reference pricing also puts the individual’s
135
own dollars at stake, but reverses who pays the first dollar of coverage.
Instead of making the patient pay for the first few thousand dollars of
care, health plans agree to pay the price for a given service charged by a
low priced provider, and the individual is free to seek care from a range
of other providers but is responsible for the difference between that
136
provider’s higher price and the reference price. Health economist
Austin Frakt illustrates the difference between deductibles and reference
pricing by analogizing deductibles to being told that insurance will pay
137
for any Toyota you want if you pay the first $500. You would likely
pick the most expensive car, such as an $80,000 Land Cruiser. With
reference pricing, you are told that insurance will cover the first $15,000
138
of any Toyota, but you have to pay the excess price. In this example,
reference pricing will clearly lead to more value and price-sensitive
shopping by the consumer who may opt for a Toyota Yaris instead of a
Land Cruiser.
Proponents say reference pricing makes patients more sensitive to
the differences in price between hospitals than CDHC, where most
139
hospital visits will exceed the patient’s deductible. The increased price
sensitivity from reference pricing creates market pressure for high-priced
providers to lower their prices closer to the reference price or else lose
business. One advantage of reference pricing over CDHC is that it relies
on the health plan to gather and report the providers’ price information
133. See Jost, supra note 115, at 385; Rosenthal & Daniels, supra note 90, at 679.
134. See Rosenthal & Daniels, supra note 90, at 678.
[I]n contrast to traditional insurance plans, when employers contribute to savings accounts
in CDHPs, they are distributing some portion of the healthcare benefit directly to all
enrollees (the account), not just those needing care. These account dollars may exceed
annual health care spending for healthier workers, while they will quickly be expended by
those who are chronically ill. As many have noted, unless savings from CDHPs are realized
and redistributed, or other subsidies are given to those who are less healthy, there is an
inevitable redistribution in favor of the healthy.
Id.
135. See Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 58, at 2029.
136. Reinhardt, supra note 76.
137. Austin Frakt, Is Reference Pricing a Good Deal?, AcademyHealth Blog (May 23, 2013),
http://blog.academyhealth.org/is-reference-pricing-a-good-deal/.
138. Id.
139. Editorial, The Weird World of Colonoscopy Costs, N.Y. Times (June 9, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/06/09/opinion/sunday/the-weird-world-of-colonoscopy-costs.html.
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rather than the individual, who may not have sufficient data or
140
wherewithal to evaluate the different options. Health insurers favor
reference pricing because it caps their financial responsibility for a
141
particular service.
There is early evidence that reference pricing can nudge patients
toward more cost-effective choices and cause high-priced providers to
142
lower prices closer to reference price levels. Payers are starting to use
reference pricing for hospital or outpatient services, but generally only
for certain standardized procedures where there is wide price variation
143
but little variation in quality, such as colonoscopy or hip replacement.
In addition, the service ought to be “shoppable,” that is, a nonurgent
service that allows the patient time to shop around, with readily available
information regarding price and quality, and for which there are several
144
choices of provider.
Reference pricing also has limitations. Most health care spending is
for services that are not shoppable and are therefore ill-suited for
145
reference pricing. To make up profits that it loses on reference-priced
services, hospitals may simply raise prices for non-reference priced
146
services. One study suggests reference pricing may have a limited
impact on total spending because it tends to affect prices only at the
147
highest end of the price distribution. Some of the barriers to CDHC,
such as lack of choices, lack of available data, reliance on physician
recommendations, and impaired ability to make choices based on
information given, could similarly afflict reference pricing initiatives.
140. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w211.
141. Frakt, supra note 137.
142. Paul Fronstin & M. Christopher Roebuck, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Reference
Pricing for Health Care Services: A New Twist on the Defined Contribution Concept in
Employment-Based Health Benefits 5 (2014); see also Sarah Thomson et al., Value-Based Cost
Sharing in the United States and Elsewhere Can Increase Patients’ Use of High-Value Goods and
Services, 32 Health Aff. 704, 706 (2013) (showing that reference pricing lead consumers to switch
from higher priced brand-name prescriptions to lower priced generics without adverse health impacts).
For a discussion of the effects of reference pricing used by CalPERS, which covers California’s public
retirees, see James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases in Consumer Cost Sharing Redirect
Patient Volumes and Reduce Hospital Prices for Orthopedic Surgery, 32 Health Aff. 1392, 139397
(2013) (showing how reference pricing initiative for hip and knee replacements led to a 21.2% increase
in CalPERS patients at low-priced hospitals and a 34.4% decrease at high-priced hospitals, leading
many high-priced hospitals reduced their prices for the procedures for CalPERS in response).
143. See Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 58, at 203435; Fronstin & Roebuck, supra note 142,
at 4 (“In 2012, 11 percent of employers with 500 or more workers were using some type of [reference
pricing], and another 16 percent were considering it.”).
144. See Chapin White & Megan Eguchi, Nat’l Inst. for Health Care Reform, Reference
Pricing: A Small Piece of the Health Care Prices and Quality Puzzle 2 (2014); Ginsburg, supra
note 74, at w210.
145. White & Eguchi, supra note 144, at 4 (“Using an inclusive definition, all shoppable services
accounted for about a third of total spending if both inpatient and ambulatory services are included.”).
146. Fronstin & Roebuck, supra note 142, at 5.
147. White & Eguchi, supra note 144, at 1.
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Reference pricing comes with a thorny technical problem of how to set
the reference price. Set too high, and the cost-savings will be lost, with
148
lower-priced providers raising their prices up to the reference price. Set
too low, and the providers may not be able to cover the cost of providing
the service, leading providers to drop the service, to cost-shift to more
remunerative services, or to seek market power as a method of resisting
149
reference pricing.
4.

Tiering and Narrow Networks

Another market approach relies upon health insurance plans to engage
in active purchasing in the form of narrow or tiered networks to pressure
150
hospitals and other providers to restrain prices. In a narrow network,
payers selectively contract with a limited group of providers who will
151
agree to lower prices in exchange for patient volume. Under a tiering
strategy, the health plan sorts contracted providers or service lines into
tiers based on price and steers patients to the lower priced providers (the
152
preferred tier) using lower cost-sharing incentives. In their roles
curating the narrow or tiered network, the health plan is the one wielding
the consumer power on behalf of the patient.
Neither approach is new. Narrow networks and tiering were both
strategies widespread during the rise of managed care and HMOs in the
153
1980s and 1990s. Consumers and employers vociferously resisted
choice-limiting networks then, and it is unclear whether they will accept
154
similarly narrowed choices today. Nevertheless, tiering and narrow
networks are gaining renewed attention as solutions to discipline health
155
care prices. The ACA has accelerated the revival of narrow networks
because of its limits on health plans’ ability to engage in underwriting or
156
to narrow benefits to keep premiums down. Thus, one of the remaining

148. Id. at 9.
149. Id. at 10.
150. Chapin White et al., Understanding Differences Between High- and Low-Price Hospitals:
Implications for Efforts to Rein in Costs, 33 Health Aff. 324, 330 (2014).
151. Id.
152. Paul B. Ginsburg & L. Gregory Pawlson, Seeking Lower Prices Where Providers Are
Consolidated: An Examination of Market and Policy Strategies, 33 Health Aff. 1067, 1069 (2014).
153. Robert A. Berenson et al., supra note 44, at 975.
154. Muir et al., supra note 100, at 339.
155. See, e.g., Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152,
at 1069; White et al., supra note 150, at 330.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2010) (establishing limits on health plan underwriting on the basis of
health status); 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2010) (establishing requirements for health plans to cover the
essential health benefits).
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strategies for health plans to keep their prices in check is to offer narrow
157
networks of providers.
Narrow networks and tiering strategies rely upon the existence of
sufficient competition among hospitals, which is lacking in many
158
markets. Without competition, powerful providers use their market
power to require anti-tiering provisions in their contracts with health
plans, or else require that the plan always include the high-priced hospital
159
in the most preferred tier. To address this issue, Massachusetts passed a
law in 2010 prohibiting providers from using anti-tiering provisions in
160
their plan contracts. Even with such a law, health plans may have no
choice but to include high priced hospitals in their network or in the best
tier because they have unique services, such as a Level I trauma facility
or a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”), that lower priced hospitals
161
lack. In most places, health plans will be unable to exclude “must162
have” providers from the highest tier due to their market power.
5.

Market Approaches Measured Against Health Care Market
Failures

Market solutions to the hospital pricing problem are intuitively
pleasingthey attempt to restore market forces to a failed market. Price
transparency and reference pricing take aim at correcting information
asymmetry and helping patients become informed consumers. It may be
technically difficult to implement price transparency or reference pricing,
but it is plausible that well-designed programs can prompt effective
163
The cost-sharing imposed on
comparison shopping by patients.
individuals by CDHC, especially in the form of reference pricing, attempts
to address moral hazard and sensitizes patients to the prices of their care.
The biggest problem with market approaches to discipline hospital
prices is that they fundamentally will not work in concentrated markets
164
where there is little choice or competition between providers. And as

157. See David Cusano & Amy Thomas, Narrow Networks Under the ACA: Financial Drivers and
Implementation Strategies, Health Aff. Blog (Feb. 17, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/17/
narrow-networks-under-the-aca-financial-drivers-and-implementation-strategies/.
158. See supra Part I.B.
159. Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, at 1070.
160. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 1760, § 9A (West 2012).
161. White et al., supra note 150, at 330.
162. Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to the
Center of Health Policy, Health Aff. Blog (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/03/
acknowledging-the-elephant-moving-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-health-policy/.
163. See, e.g., Sze-jung Wu et al., Price Transparency for MRIs Increased Use of Less Costly
Providers and Triggered Provider Competition, 33 Health Aff. 1391, 139495 (2014).
164. Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1085 (“If sellers have too much market power, in other words, a
policy that supports a shift in the buying function from insurers with some market power to consumers
with effectively none is not likely to succeed in imposing discipline on producers from the demand
side.”).
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discussed above, concentrated hospital markets are the norm, not the
165
exception. Where there is no choice, patients cannot shop around or
substitute the lower cost or higher value provider. Where hospital-sellers
have disproportionate market power, purchasers (health plans or patients)
can exert little discipline on prices through transparency, CDHC,
reference pricing, or active purchasing.
Moreover, the stressful nature of most hospital encounters makes it
unlikely for transparency plus CDHC to overcome patients’ substantial
166
cognitive and behavioral barriers to rational consumer behavior. Even
when equipped with sufficient price and quality information, when it
comes to serious medical decisions, patients generally defer to their
167
physicians. Buying health care is thus unlike shopping for a car, unless
one imagines buying a car while being chased by a gunman, when there
are only a couple unfamiliar models to choose from, relying upon the
guidance of a trusted car salesman who tells you which car is best for
your situation and also serves as your driver as you try to get away.
Although market approaches attempt to address information asymmetry
and moral hazard, the principal-agent problems persist. Health plans
and/or providers are in the best position to gather, report, and translate
price and quality information for patients, and thus market approaches
168
build upon the existing web of principal-agent relationships.
Finally, market solutions like price transparency or reference pricing
169
are inherently limited because much of health care is not “shoppable.”
Acute or urgent health care does not lend itself to comparison or price
shopping, and patients end up seeking care at the nearest hospital, the
one to which the ambulance delivers them, or the one to which they are
referred to by their physician.
Market solutions are premised on improving informational deficits
and sensitizing consumers to their health care costs to bring competitive
forces to bear on health care prices. As an overall strategy to discipline
health care prices, however, market solutions are fundamentally limited
because they fail to address the underlying lack of competition in
170
hospital markets and barriers to patient consumer behavior.

165. See supra Part I.B.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 12325.
167. See Greaney, supra note 64, at 1200.
168. Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n, supra note 3, at 3 (“Health plans should serve as the principal
source of price information for their members. . . . The provider should be the principal source of price
information for uninsured patients and patients who are seeking care from the provider on an out-ofnetwork basis.”).
169. See White & Eguchi, supra note 144, at 4.
170. Paul B. Ginsburg, All-Payer Rate Setting: A Response to a ‘Modest Proposal’ from Uwe
Reinhardt, Health Aff. Blog (July 24, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/07/24/all-payer-ratesetting-a-response-to-a-modest-proposal-from-uwe-reinhardt/.
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B. Antitrust Enforcement
1.

Antitrust Strategies to Address Hospital Market Power

If market solutions fail to address the problem of health care market
concentration, one response is to use antitrust laws to address provider
171
market power. First, the FTC can use its power under section 7 of the
Clayton Act to oppose horizontal hospital mergers that “lessen
172
competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly.” Using this approach,
the antitrust agencies can block proposed mergers or, occasionally, seek
173
divestiture of a consummated merger. The general analytic framework
for horizontal mergers requires definition of the geographic and product
markets at issue as well as assessment of the potential anticompetitive
174
effects of the merged entity’s increased market share.
Second, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, antitrust agencies can
police efforts by provider networks to engage in joint contracting with
health plans, a form of price fixing among otherwise independent and
175
competing providers. These types of provider networks implicate
health care prices when hospitals vertically integrate with physician
practices through ACOs, physician-hospital organizations, or physician
176
practice acquisition. Hospitals can use these strategies to increase their
market share by “locking up” physician referrals from large networks of
physicians and bundling hospital and physician services together for
177
greater bargaining leverage over payers. Antitrust scrutiny of provider
networks is fact-specific, weighing the procompetitive efficiencies gained
by clinically and/or financially integrating an otherwise disparate and
fragmented web of providers against the anticompetitive effects of
178
increased consolidation and market power. In the case of ACOs, the
antitrust agencies will afford rule-of-reason treatment (not the stricter

171. Berenson et al., supra note 44, at 702 (quoting a health plan executive complaining about
providers’ monopoly prices in California: “We’d welcome some regulatory intervention to break up
these monopolies, because they are just killing us.”); Gaynor, supra note 42, at 1090; Havighurst &
Richman, supra note 17, at 853.
172. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2013).
173. Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969.
174. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf; see also Greaney, supra
note 17, at 193.
175. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; see Greaney, supra note 71, at 23.
176. Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is
Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 Health Aff. 756, 757 (2014).
177. Baker et al., supra note 175, at 75657; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, at 1072.
178. See Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement in
Health Care Policy, Statements 8 & 9 (1996) (describing antitrust agencies’ policies regarding
physician network joint ventures and multiprovider networks).
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per se analysis) to joint contracting by providers in ACOs that comply
179
with all of the requirements to be a Medicare ACO.
Third, antitrust agencies can police anticompetitive efforts by
dominant hospitalsoften in combination with dominant payersto
entrench their market power, exclude rivals, and establish price-setting
180
schemes. For example, hospital-payer contracts may undermine price
competition through mechanisms such as anti-tiering or most favored
181
nation (“MFN”) clauses. As discussed above, powerful providers may
insist on anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions to prevent health plans
from using different levels of cost-sharing to encourage enrollees to use
182
lower priced providers. MFN provisions are typically used by dominant
health plans to extract agreement from hospitals not to accept lower
rates from another health plan competitor, thus contractually assuring
the dominant plan will receive the best price and preventing price
183
competition from other health plans. In other contexts, antitrust agencies
have pursued collusion between “must-have” hospitals and dominant
184
payers to protect the other from competition, or hospitals’ pricing
discounts to payers in exchange for the payers’ agreement not to contract
185
with or accept better prices from the hospital’s competitors. The color
and stripe of antitrust abuse vary with the particulars of the market, but
successful enforcement is rare and fact-intensive, with the law and
outcomes often unclear. As a result, antitrust law is an inherently imperfect
strategy to address the widespread monopoly problem in the hospital
186
market.
2.

Antitrust Strategies Measured Against Health Care Market
Failures

Aggressive antitrust enforcement may be critical to preserving
competition in markets that have not already become highly concentrated.

179. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011); see
also Greaney, supra note 16, at 23 (noting that the ACO antitrust policy statement also establishes
safety zones for calculating acceptable levels of market power that are specific to ACOs).
180. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 3031.
181. See Sage, supra note 49, at 108081.
182. See supra text accompanying note 156.
183. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-14155).
184. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).
185. Complaint at 1, United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)
(No. 7:11-cv-00030); Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007). For a good
discussion of these cases, see Greaney, supra note 71, at 2831.
186. Greaney, supra note 16, at 3031 (“While antitrust litigation can challenge these tactics, such
cases are fact-intensive, require extensive analysis, and fall in areas in which the law remains unsettled.
. . . As a result, antitrust law is more paper tiger than bulwark against abuse when dealing with
incumbent monopolies.”).
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As an overall solution to discipline health care prices, however, antitrust
enforcement is significantly limited. There is little the antitrust laws can
do to break up or reverse existing monopolies, so antitrust enforcement
is little help to the many provider markets where concentration has
187
already occurred. As forcefully stated by Thomas Greaney,
A common misapprehension among legislators and policymakers is
that antitrust law provides a reliable counterforce to monopoly. With
respect to extant monopolies, legally acquired, the opposite is true:
antitrust law tolerates the exercise of market power (which includes
charging higher prices, reducing output, and lowering quality) and
generally intervenes only where monopolists wrongfully exercise that
188
power to exclude or harm rivals.

For a stretch of time from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, antitrust
agencies ran into a judicial wall when opposing hospital mergers, with
189
courts dealing the agencies seven consecutive losses. Although the
FTC’s losing streak subsequently broke, it remains true today that
antitrust enforcement to prevent hospital mergers has been largely
190
ineffective at counteracting the wave of consolidation in the industry.
Market power gained lawfully is unreachable by antitrust
191
enforcement. For example, a hospital may be a “must-have” hospital
because it is one of the few providers of unique services such as a Level I
192
Trauma unit, NICU, or transplant service. Or the hospital may be the
sole provider in a rural area that cannot support more than one
193
hospital. Other hospitals, like Cedars-Sinai in Los Angeles, may have a
reputation that makes them powerful (in the case of Cedars-Sinai, it is
194
Large,
the preferred hospital for Hollywood celebrities).
geographically dispersed health care systems may bargain collectively,
187. Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969; Gaynor, supra note 42, at 1090; Havighurst &
Richman, supra note 17, at 871.
188. Greaney, supra note 16, at 27.
189. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085
(N.D. Cal. 2000), amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001); United States v. Long
Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946
F. Supp. 1285, 1302-03 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8,
1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot,
107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997); Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 (1994); see also
Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care,
21 Health Aff. 185, 187 (noting that the cases show a “judicial disdain for applying traditional
antitrust principles to health care providers”).
190. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 17, at 849 (“[The government’s] inability over time to
apply antitrust law rigorously and systematically in the big business that health care has become is one
importantthough not the onlyreason why many health care markets are now dominated by firms
with alarming pricing power.”).
191. See Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 97374.
192. White et al., supra note 150, at 327.
193. See Berenson, supra note 162.
194. See Berenson et al., supra note 44, at 702.
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195

leveraging a flagship hospital for higher prices across the system. But
because the system’s facilities are spread out across many hospital
markets, such collective price negotiation is typically beyond the reach of
196
antitrust law. These types of market power were acquired legally and
are not amenable to antitrust enforcement.
Much of the current provider consolidation is occurring in response
to payment and delivery reforms like ACOs or bundled payments, which
may have many salutary benefits in terms of better care coordination,
197
reduction of fragmentation, and improved quality. Thus, the antitrust
agencies have chosen to tread lightly when it comes to these integration
198
efforts despite their attendant risks to competition. Payment and
delivery reforms address the principal-agent problem of providers’ inherent
incentives to create demand for their own services, which antitrust policy
does not address. Thus, antitrust policy has a difficult needle to thread: it
must be flexible enough to accommodate health care delivery innovations
while containing the effects of provider market power.
Because antitrust enforcement can do little to address existing
monopolies, antitrust enforcement is an inadequate solution to the
problem of provider market power. Additional regulatory efforts are
required to promote competition in the concentrated hospital market,
such as repeal of state CON law regimes that prevent entry into the
hospital market or avoidance of “any willing provider” laws that stymie
199
narrow networks and price competition. However, even these augmented
approaches to competition policy do not address providers’ motivations to
consolidate: to increase bargaining leverage over a fragmented payer
200
landscape.
Antitrust policy also does not touch many of the other features of
market failure in the hospital market, such as information asymmetry,
moral hazard, principal-agent problems, or externalities. As discussed in
Part III, the theory of “second best” warns that where there are multiple
types of market failure, addressing one but not the others might actually
result in reduced efficiency and welfare and even worse outcomes than
201
doing nothing at all.

195. Id.
196. Berenson, supra note 43, at 976; Greaney, supra note 16, at 21.
197. Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, at 1067.
198. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations,
supra note 179, at 67,026; see also Greaney, supra note 16, at 2324.
199. See Gaynor, supra note 42, at 109091.
200. See Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 977.
201. Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 849, 85354 (2000).
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C. Payment and Delivery Reforms
1.

ACOs and Bundled Payments

Payment and delivery reforms are premised on the hope that
altering the financial incentives in our health care system will result in
structural changes that fix the fragmented, inefficient, poor quality, and
202
costly health care delivery system. Of all the payment and delivery
reforms set in motion by the ACA, ACOs generated the most
203
anticipation. ACOs are the flagship among an assortment of Medicare
reforms in the ACA that all aim at paying for value in health care instead
204
of volume.
In the early 2000s, researchers at Dartmouth’s Atlas of Health Care
revealed large variations in Medicare spending across geographic regions
and demonstrated that higher spending does not lead to better health
205
outcomes. They concluded that approximately thirty percent of the
nation’s Medicare spending could be eliminated without negative impacts
206
on health simply by reducing geographic variations in spending. Because
this research was based on Medicare spending, the variations were due to
practice patterns and utilization, not differences in price. In the private
market, geographic spending variations are compounded by price
207
differences as well as utilization patterns.
The Dartmouth researchers, led by Elliott Fisher, devised a model
now known as an ACO to create financial incentives and structural
reforms to move the high-spending regions toward the practices of the
208
more efficient regions. The idea of the ACO is to reward groups of
physicians and other providers for improving quality and care coordination
while reducing unnecessary utilization by paying them a share of the
202. See David Cutler, How Health Care Reform Must Bend the Cost Curve, 29 Health Aff. 1131,
113334 (2010).
203. Rob Cunningham, The Payment Reform Paradox, 33 Health Aff. 735, 735 (2014).
204. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 1.
205. Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1:
The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 Annals Internal Med. 273, 273 (2003)
[hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations of Medicare Spending Part 1]; Elliott S. Fisher et al., The
Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction
with Care, 138 Annals Internal Med. 288, 288 (2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations
of Medicare Spending Part 2].
206. Fisher et al., Regional Variations of Medicare Spending Part 1, supra note 205, at 273.
207. Newhouse & Garber, supra note 46, at 1227–28 (“Whereas price variation explains almost
none of the overall variation in Medicare expenditures (after adjusting for wage variation), price
variation is responsible for an estimated 70% of the total geographic variation in spending among
privately insured persons.”).
208. Transcript of Proceedings at 280–363, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n: Pub. Meeting
(Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/november-2006-meeting-transcript.pdf (describing
the ACO model variously as “extended hospital staff” and “accountable organization”); see also
Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff,
26 Health Aff. w44 (2006–2007).
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209

amount they save for the payer. The model was adopted by the ACA in
the form of the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which establishes
ACOs for Medicare with the intent that the model will spread to the
210
private market. The goal is to move the health care market away from
the inefficient, highly fragmented, volume-based fee-for-service payment
211
model toward a more efficient, coordinated, and value-based system.
In a similar vein, the ACA also created a pilot program to bundle
Medicare payments for an entire episode of care for certain conditions,
where the hospital receives a single lump sum payment to cover all
inpatient, physician, outpatient, and post-acute services involved in the
212
episode of care. Payment bundling creates incentives for fragmented
providers to work together, improve efficiency, and internalize the costs
of a poorly managed episode of care.
The strategies underlying ACOs and payment bundling are not new;
they are similar to the ways providers assumed financial risks (and
benefits) under capitated payments from managed care companies in the
213
1990s. The main differences are that ACO models seek to preserve
patients’ choice of provider and are designed to be driven by providers
214
rather than by payers. In their purest form, HMOs with capitation did
reduce health care spending and utilization, but patients and providers
alike opposed them as blunt instruments of rationing and because of
215
limitations in their choice of providers.
As discussed above, ACOs and bundled payments create pressures
for providers to consolidate, particularly through vertically integrated
216
networks of physicians, hospitals, and post-acute providers. In its benign
form, ACOs encourage efficient consolidation because they require
providers to come together to coordinate care, assume financial risk, and
217
share and report data. The consolidation may improve efficiency by
reducing duplicative or wasteful services, as well as by aligning the
financial and clinical incentives of disparate providers. In the private market,
however, vertical integration and ACO formation may be motivated as
much or more by the desire to gain market share and bargaining leverage

209. Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare,
28 Health Aff. w219, w222 (2009).
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2013); see also Greaney, supra note 16, at 1617.
211. Fisher, supra note 209, at w221.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2013); accord White et al., supra note 150, at 2.
213. Robert A. Berenson & Rachel A. Burton, Urban Inst., Accountable Care
Organizations in Medicare and the Private Sector: A Status Update 12 (2011).
214. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 7.
215. See Berenson & Burton, supra note 213, at 1; see also Muir et al., supra note 15, at 339.
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See Baker et al., supra note 176, at 762.
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against health plans, which may work against the goals of systemic cost218
savings or rationalization of care.
2.

Payment and Delivery Reforms Measured Against Health Care
Market Failures

At their heart, payment and delivery reforms are not aimed at
disciplining health care prices. ACOs and bundled payments attempt to
restrain overall health care spending by reducing unnecessary utilization,
not by constraining prices. Simply altering the payment methodology
219
does not have much influence on ultimate prices. Importantly, these
reforms do not address the market concentration problem and in fact
220
exacerbate it by spurring further consolidation among providers.
Payment and delivery reforms have some prospect of addressing the
informational asymmetries in health care prices. The hope is that
measuring ACOs for quality performance and cost-savings will also
221
improve cost and quality transparency of participating providers. To
the extent that payment bundling groups together disparate parts of an
episode of care, it may create a more understandable and comparable
product to evaluate for price or quality purposes. For example, it is easier
to comparison shop for an entire episode of care, such as the total cost of
222
delivering a baby, than for each unbundled piece of the care. However,
there is nothing inherent about the ACO model or bundled payments
that encourage patients to deploy consumeristic choices amongst
providers. If anything, the incentive runs in the opposite direction,
encouraging patients to stay within the ACO or group of providers included
in the bundled payment rather than shopping among competitors.
Of all the health care market failures, payment and delivery reforms
most directly address the principal-agent problem by attempting to align
the incentives of the payer and different providers (hospital, physicians,
223
post-acute care, and so on) involved in the patient’s care. Payment and

218. Cunningham, supra note 203, at 737 (“If the object of these alliances is to make more money,
they can’t be expected to transform health care.”).
219. See Massachusetts AG 2010 Report, supra note 10, at 4 (“Variation in total medical expenses
on a per member per month basis is not correlated to the methodology used to pay for health care,
with total medical expenses sometimes higher for risk-sharing providers than for providers paid on a
fee-for-service basis.”).
220. See Austin Frakt, Bigger Health Companies: Good for Medicare, Maybe Not for Others, N.Y.
Times: Upshot (June 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/upshot/bigger-health-companiesgood-for-medicare-maybe-not-for-others.html.
221. See Fisher et al., supra note 208, at w223.
222. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. Times (June 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-way-of-birth-costliest-in-the-world.html (“Only
in the United States is pregnancy generally billed item by item, a practice that has spiraled in the past
decade, doctors say. No item is too small. Charges that 20 years ago were lumped together and
covered under the general hospital fee are now broken out, leading to more bills and inflated costs.”).
223. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 45, 1516.
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delivery reforms address the central principal-agent relationship between
the patient and the physician who directs the patient’s care, by
dampening the physician’s financial incentives to order unnecessary and
224
potentially harmful tests and services. The providers’ incentives are
also aligned with the payers’ because if the providers save the payer
money, then the providers share some of the savings.
In the end, the payment and delivery reforms’ abilities to discipline
health care prices are threatened by their tendency to increase provider
225
market power. Hospitals, physician groups, and other providers are
consolidating to form ACOs, which can lead to higher prices in the
226
private market. Perversely, the ACOs’ constraints on utilization may
create incentives for providers with market power to raise their prices.
As bluntly stated by the Urban Institute’s Robert Berenson, “[I]t is
unlikely that an organization can offset the higher spending resulting
from exorbitant prices by decreasing the volume of services. Or put more
227
pithily, higher prices eat decreased volume for lunch.”
D. Consumer Protections
Consumer protections take aim at only one aspect of the hospital
pricing problem: the externalities of excessive hospital prices and
aggressive debt collection on individual patients who may be uninsured
or underinsured. Consumer protections can take the form of stronger
judicial supervision in favor of the consumer when enforcing contracts for
services between hospitals and self-pay patients. Alternatively, consumer
protections could take the form of state fair pricing and collection laws
that limit the amounts hospitals may charge to financially vulnerable
228
patients and their bill collection actions. Overall, the consumer protection
approach does not attempt to rationalize the whole system of hospital
pricing, but rather protects the individual patient from the externalities
of unreasonable hospital prices.

224. See Fisher, supra note 209, at w22021.
225. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 20 (“Provider market power poses the biggest obstacle to the
success of the ACO strategy.”).
226. See Baker et al., supra note 176, at 75657.
227. See Berenson, supra note 162.
228. A third alternative would be for a patient to pursue a claim against hospitals for violating
state consumer protection statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices (“UDTPs”).
Despite the near-perfect fit between the legal conception of unfairness and hospital billing practices
toward uninsured or out-of-network patients, courts have generally been hostile to claims by
uninsured patients under state UDTP laws. See, e.g., Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp.
2d 562, 565–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated in part on jurisdiction grounds, Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian
Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006); Grant v. Trinity Health-Mich., 390 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 n.6 (E.D.
Mich. 2005) (listing twenty-eight other cases in various federal districts where defendant hospitals
obtained dismissals in suits presented by uninsured or indigent patients).
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Contract Law and Muscular Supervisory Doctrines

Uninsured or out-of-network patients are generally charged what
229
are known as “full charges,” or the retail list prices for hospital services.
These highly inflated prices are more than twice what private insurers
230
pay and three to five times higher than government payers. Largely in
response to the problem of the uninsured being charged full, undiscounted
hospital prices, Mark Hall and Carl Schneider have advocated that courts
adopt a protective stance through muscular use of supervisory doctrines
when enforcing contracts between hospitals and uninsured patients for
231
services. The supervisory doctrines would allow courts to revise or
reject vague or oppressive contracts when, as is the case of uninsured
patients, one party lacks any meaningful bargaining power and enters the
contract in a vulnerable state.
The supervisory doctrines Hall and Schneider have advocated include:
(1) supplying vague or missing price terms, such as when hospital contracts
232
obligate patients to pay a hospital’s “usual charges” or “regular rates,”
(2) amending or refusing to enforce unconscionable hospital-patient
233
contracts, and (3) evaluating the fairness of health care fiduciaries’ pricing
234
in open-ended hospital contracts for services. Courts can deploy these
doctrines to substitute a more reasonable price for the ones often charged
235
by hospitals to uninsured or self-pay patients. The larger argument
advanced by Hall and Schneider is that courts should not treat as ordinary
commercial contracts the essentially nonnegotiable agreements by selfpay patients in a state of medical duress to pay a hospital whatever it
wants to charge. Rather, knowing the complexities and failures of health
care markets, courts should feel empowered to supervise and adjust
these lopsided contract terms as needed to make them more fair and
reasonable.
Use of the supervisory doctrines tends to focus on the unequal
bargaining power between an uninsured, vulnerable patient and a hospital.
Although hospital-patient contracts are arguably equally unconscionable
regardless of the patient’s education or means, courts might be less
willing to use the supervisory doctrines to protect the more affluent or
sophisticated consumers, who might not be perceived to be as vulnerable
229. See Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Health Care 65
(2006); Anderson, supra note 11, at 780.
230. Barry Meier et al., Hospital Billing Varies Wildly, Government Data Shows, N.Y. Times (May 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/business/hospital-billing-varies-wildly-us-data-shows.html; Uwe E.
Reinhardt, What Hospitals Charge the Uninsured, N.Y. Times: Economix (Mar. 15, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/what-hospitals-charge-the-uninsured/.
231. Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 671.
232. Id. at 673.
233. Id. at 678.
234. Id. at 681.
235. Id. at 68485.
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and worthy of protection as the uninsured poor. For insured patients who
receive care out-of-network and are charged inflated prices, courts might
be even less willing to use supervisory doctrines because the patient’s
insurance contract likely specifies that out-of-network care is not covered
or that the patient may be charged additional amounts from an out-ofnetwork provider.
When an insured patient receives hospital care out-of-network, the
236
hospital does not have a contractual, negotiated rate with the health plan.
If the health plan covers the patient’s out-of-network care at all, the plan
typically specifies it will pay the noncontracted provider its “usual,
237
customary, and reasonable rates” (“UCR”). UCR is indeterminate and
238
often requires litigation to assign a specific dollar value to the rate. In
addition, the out-of-network provider will typically charge the patient a
“balance bill” for the difference between the UCR amount received from
the health plan and the hospital’s full charges, which can be a substantial
proportion of the bill. Patients are increasingly finding themselves
subject to out-of-network billing with the resurgence of narrow networks
239
under the ACA. Even if a patient takes pains to select an in-network
hospital, she may be subject to surprise out-of-network prices because
240
the physicians who treated her were out-of-network.
When adjudicating the amount owed by self-pay patients or noncontracted health plans for hospital services, courts engage in the critical
task of assigning a reasonable value to undefined prices. Although
assigning value to UCR would appear to be a simple matter of
determining the fair market value for specified services in the geographic
market, courts struggle with this fact-intensive task and have used
241
myriad, often conflicting, approaches to assigning values to UCR.
Possible methods include calculating UCR based on (1) Medicare rates
242
or a multiplier of Medicare rates; (2) administratively determined fee
schedules, such as state-based rates for workers’ compensation or auto

236. See Porter & Teisberg, supra note 229, at 65; Anderson, supra note 11, at 781.
237. Carol K. Lucas & Michelle A. Williams, The Rights of Nonparticipating Providers in a
Managed Care World: Navigating the Minefields of Balance Billing and Reasonable and Customary
Payments, 3 J. Health & Life Sci. L. 132, 138 (2009). UCR or a similar concept may also be used to
determine the amount an uninsured patient should pay for her care.
238. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 15254.
240. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Costs Can Go Up Fast When E.R. Is in Network but the Doctors Are Not,
N.Y. Times (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/us/costs-can-go-up-fast-when-er-is-innetwork-but-the-doctors-are-not.html?ref=health.
241. David Stahl, Health Care Reform: Presumptively Reasonable Rates for Necessary Medical
Services, 35 Nova L. Rev. 175, 18182 (2010).
242. See, e.g., In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 979 A.2d 770, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
(interpreting the reasonable fee to be 130 percent of the Medicare rate).
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243

insurance rates for hospital services; (3) independent third party
244
databases like FairHealth.org; (4) the amounts the hospital generally
accepts from its other payers, including or excluding Medicare and
245
246
Medicaid; or (5) the hospital’s full charges.
Each methodology has advantages and drawbacks, which further
depend on whether one is calculating rates owed by an uninsured patient
or a non-contracted health plan. For example, some have advocated
using a multiplier of Medicare rates to set a reasonable price for a selfpay patient because Medicare rates are transparent, widely available, and
247
are relatively free from distortions of hospital market power. However,

243. Workers compensation and auto insurers typically do not have contracted rates with hospitals
because their members make up so little of a hospital’s patient volume, so some states have
established fee schedules applicable to these payers to avoid them being charged full charges. See Fuse
Brown, supra note 7, at 51; Stahl, supra note 241, at 18990.
244. FAQs, FairHealth.org, http://www.fairhealth.org/CorporateFAQs (last visited Dec. 18,
2015). FairHealth.org was the result of an investigation by State Attorney General of New York in
2009 into the Ingenix database owned and operated by health insurance giant United Healthcare. The
investigation alleged that United had conflicts of interest and used biased data in the Ingenix database
to produce inaccurate, lower UCR calculations owed by insurance companies to providers for out-ofnetwork care. The litigation and investigation resulted in a 2009 settlement with health insurers that
called for the creation of an independent, not-for-profit database called FairHealth. For more
discussions of the Ingenix controversy, see Lucas & Williams, supra note 237, at 15562; Troy J.
Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization and
Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 241, 27579 (2010); Stahl, supra
note 241, 18587.
245. See, e.g., Baker Cty. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., LLC, 31 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (excluding Medicare and Medicaid rates); Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare
Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 50910 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (including Medicare and Medicaid rates).
Data of this sort is not always readily available because negotiated rates may be subject to contractual
confidentiality clauses. Thus, obtaining actual payment data requires more administrative digging (or
discovery) than reference to an existing fee schedule like Medicare.
246. Some courts recognize that full charges are not “reasonable” rates because they are inflated
and no payer with any bargaining clout pays anything close to these rates. See, e.g., Greenfield v.
Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 930–31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange
Park, 661 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Victory Mem’l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 979 A.2d at 785; Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc.,
46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001). Other courts, however, have concluded that billed charges are
“reasonable” because they are what is usually or customarily charged to self-pay patients or
noncontracted payers. See, e.g., Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 311 (Ind. 2012)
(holding that a patient’s agreement to pay “the account” in a contract to provide medical services is
not indefinite and refers to the hospital’s chargemaster); Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp., 791
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that “usual and customary charges” referred to the
hospital’s chargemaster prices because Black’s Law Dictionary defines charge as “to demand a fee; to
bill.”); Huntington Hosp. v. Abrandt, 779 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div. 2004); accord Kolari v. N.Y.Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[U]nder New York law a hospital’s
charges to an uninsured patient are not unreasonable merely because a lower price is charged to
government programs or other insurers.”); Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp. v. Huberty, 428 N.Y.S.2d 746
(App. Div. 1980).
247. Gerard Anderson has proposed that reasonable rates to charge a self-pay patient would be
125 percent of Medicare rates, which is higher than most commercial payers’ negotiated rates, but
significantly lower than full charges. Medicare rates are based on a methodology that takes into
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because they tend to be lower than private rates and typical calculations
of UCR, using a multiplier of Medicare for out-of-network care means
the health plan pays less and the balance bill for the insured patient
248
increases. Regardless of the methodology used to determine UCR for a
noncontracted provider, the court ought to keep in mind the harm to the
patient that comes from balance billing even if the plan’s payment
obligation is satisfied. Without legislation prohibiting balance billing,
courts might be without power to stop a hospital from balance billing a
patient even if the court is able to resolve how much the noncontracted
249
health plan owes.
2.

Hospital Fair Pricing and Balance Billing Laws

Thirteen states have passed laws that limit the amount hospitals may
charge to uninsured or self-pay patients who fall below defined income
250
levels. Many of these states plus some additional states that do not limit
charges to uninsured or underinsured patients, also regulate the debt
251
collection practices hospitals use to recover medical debt from patients,
including limitations on interest rates, liens or foreclosure actions on a
patient’s home, and wage garnishment, as well as obligations to offer
payment plans and defer assigning debt to collection agencies for
account the hospital’s costs, geographic variation, and resource intensity of particular services. See
Anderson, supra note 11, at 787. Mark Hall and Carl Schneider suggested capping rates that providers
may charge self-pay patients at 150 percent of Medicare rates or a weighted average of what large
private insurers pay in the region. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Price-Gouging by Doctors and
Hospitals, Health Reform Watch (July 19, 2009), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/07/19/pricegouging-by-doctors-and-hospitals/.
248. Nina Bernstein, Insurers Alter Cost Formula, and Patients Pay More, N.Y. Times (Apr. 23,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/nyregion/health-insurers-switch-baseline-for-out-of-networkcharges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (observing an increasing trend toward insurance companies
paying 140 percent to 250 percent of Medicare for out-of-network care, instead of eighty percent of
UCR, resulting in lower payments by the insurance plan and large balance-bills for the patient).
249. For discussion of state balance billing bans, see infra Part II.D.3.
250. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 127400-127446 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-112
(2013); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 19a-673 (West 2014); 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. 88/1-88/999 (2013); Md. Code
Ann. Health-Gen. §§ 19-214.2, -214.3 (West 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-7-35 (West 2014); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 439B.260 (2014); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.52 (West 2013); N.Y. Pub. Health Law §
2807-k (McKinney 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-723.2 (2007); 27-50 R.I. Code R. § 11.0:31-4-9
(LexisNexis 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-262 (2015); Wash. Rev. Code § 70.170.010–.905 (1998).
Although it has not passed a law, Utah has issued administrative guidance outlining standards for
property tax exemption that includes a requirement that nonprofit hospitals not charge indigent
patients for medically necessary care. Utah State Tax Comm’n, Property Tax Exemptions: Standards
of Practice 26–29 (2015), http://propertytax.utah.gov/library/pdf/standards/standard02.pdf. See generally
Hosp. Cmty. Benefit Program, Hilltop Inst., http://www.hilltopinstitute.org/hcbp_cbl_state_table.
cfm?select=lcbc; Families U.S.A., Medical Debt: What States Are Doing to Protect Consumers
(2009), http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/medical-debt-state-protections.pdf.
251. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310(c) (2005); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20:1(A)(2) (2014); Me. Rev. Stat.
tit. 9-A, §5-116-A (2009); 114.6 Mass. Code Regs. § 12.08(1)(b) (2015); N.D. Cent. Code § 13-0114.1(4) (2001); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.66(A)(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013). See Hosp. Cmty. Benefit
Program, supra note 250.
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specified time periods. At the federal level, the ACA created new
requirements limiting the amount tax-exempt hospitals may charge to
patients who are eligible under the hospital’s financial assistance policy
as well as requiring such hospitals to make reasonable efforts to
253
determine eligibility before pursuing debt collection actions.
An example is California’s Fair Pricing Act, passed in 2006, which
limits the amounts hospitals may charge uninsured patients below three
hundred and fifty percent of the federal poverty limit (“FPL”) or insured
patients below three hundred and fifty percent of the FPL whose medical
254
bills exceed ten percent of their income. Hospitals may not charge
these patients more than the highest amount paid by any government
program (for example, Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP). By 2011, most
California hospitals had adopted financial assistance policies and gone
beyond the bare requirements of the Act, with ninety-seven percent
offering free care to those below one hundred percent of the FPL and a
significant percentage limiting charges to Medicare rates for those above
255
three hundred fifty percent of FPL. New Jersey passed a law in 2008
that limits the amount hospitals may charge uninsured patients who
make up to five hundred percent of the FPL to Medicare rates plus
fifteen percent and requires hospitals to provide free care to those who
256
make less than two hundred percent of the FPL.
These laws cap rates for financially vulnerable patients, but they do
not eliminate price discrimination among payers or prevent inflated
charges to middle class uninsured patients, or insured patients who are
257
out-of-network. Nor do they address hospitals’ market power and
variations in price. These laws seek to reduce the number of people who
are billed full charges without actually rationalizing these charges.
Virtually every state has laws restricting balance billing by innetwork providers to managed care enrollees, but twelve states extend

252. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Fair Hospital Prices Are Not Charity: Decoupling Hospital Pricing
and Collection Rules from Tax Status, 53 U. Louisville L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 43–44).
253. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 85558 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(2014)). The federal 501(r) rules contain many gaps in protection,
including that they do not apply to for-profit or government-run facilities and they leave eligibility for
financial assistance to the complete discretion of hospitals. For an in-depth discussion of the 501(r)
rules and state fair pricing laws, see Fuse Brown, supra note 252, at 4243.
254. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 127400-127446 (West 2012); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22,
§§ 96000–96150 (2007); see Glenn Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Fair Pricing Law Prompts Most
California Hospitals to Adopt Policies to Protect Uninsured Patients from High Charges, 32 Health
Aff. 1101, 1102 (2013).
255. See Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 254, at 1104.
256. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.52 (West 2013).
257. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 768–87.
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258

balance billing restrictions even to out-of-network providers. These
states include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah,
259
and West Virginia. Although these laws vary in scope and degree,
balance billing prohibitions generally protect the patient from receiving
bills for the difference between what their health plan pays the out-of260
network provider and the provider’s full charges. Some laws only apply
to emergency services, while others apply to a broader range of covered
261
benefits. Balance billing is a problem in nonemergency care, such as
when the hospital is in-network, but the surgeon or anesthesiologist is
262
In addition, state balance billing laws may be
out-of-network.
preempted by ERISA for self-insured employer plans.

258. State Restriction Against Providers Balance Billing Managed Care Enrollees, Henry J. Kaiser
Fam. Found., http://kff.org/private-insurance/state-indicator/state-restriction-against-providers-balancebilling-managed-care-enrollees/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
259. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1379 (West 2013); Prospect Med. Grp. v. Northridge
Emergency Med. Grp., 198 P.3d 86 (Cal. 2009) (ruling that HMO members may not be balanced
billed); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-7f (West 1998) (protecting an enrollee of a managed care plan
from balance billing from “any health care provider”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3565 (2011)
(protecting members of “individual and group health insurance policies” from balance billing); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2322F (2009) (protecting those covered by workers compensation from balance
billing); Fla. Stat. § 641.3154, .513 (2015) (protecting HMO members from balance billing for nonnetwork emergency care); Fla. Stat. § 641.513 (2015) (protecting HMO members from balance billing
for non-network emergency care); Ind. Code § 32-33-4-3.5 (2013) (prohibiting hospital lienholders
from balance billing patients); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 19-710(i) (West 2014) (holding HMO
subscribers harmless for covered services in and out of network; statute mandates HMO payment to
non-contractual providers); N.J. Admin. Code § 11:3-29.6 (protecting “any person” from balance
billing by health care providers); 2014 N.Y. Sess. Law § 6914 (McKinney) (protecting individuals
insured under a health care plan from balance billing for a “surprise bill” by a “non-participating
physician” that knows the individual is insured); 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 449.34 (West 1990) (prohibiting
any primary health care practitioner, or any primary health center, corporation, facility, institution or
other entity that employs a health care practitioner from balance billing); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 2741-26 (West 2003) (protecting enrollees of an HMO from balance billing by “any provider” for charges
for covered health services); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-8-501(5) (West 2012) (prohibiting out-ofnetwork providers from balance billing when an HMO or PPO enrollee lives or resides within thirty
miles of a federally qualified health center or independent hospital or is in closer proximity to these
providers than another contracting hospital); W. Va. Code § 33-25A-7a (1996) (protecting HMO
members from balance billing if the provider is aware patient is HMO subscriber). In addition,
Colorado requires managed care companies to hold members harmless for out-of-network balance
bills, but it does not prevent the provider from balance billing. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-16-704(2)(a)
(2015).
260. See Jack Hoadley et al., Unexpected Charges: What States Are Doing About Balance
Billing 69 (2009).
261. See State Restriction Against Providers, supra note 258.
262. See Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 6; Roni Caryn Rabin, Out-of-Network Bills for In-Network
Health Care, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/out-ofnetwork-bills-for-in-network-health-care/; Tara Siegel Bernard, Out of Network, Not by Choice, and
Facing Huge Health Bills, N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/yourmoney/out-of-network-not-by-choice-and-facing-huge-health-bills.html.
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These balance billing laws shield a subset of patients including
insured persons receiving care out-of-network from the harms of excess
hospital charges. As with many of these solutions, balance billing laws do
not address the fundamental market failures afflicting hospital pricing.
Nevertheless, balance billing laws remain an important protection for
individuals, especially as the proliferation of narrow networks makes it
263
more likely a patient will find herself out-of-network.
3.

Consumer Protections Measured Against Health Care Market
Failures

The consumer protection solutions are not really solutions to
discipline health care prices on the whole, but to protect some of the
most vulnerable patients from the harms of unrestrained hospital pricing.
The main market failure addressed by consumer protection is the
externalities imposed on individual patients when they are charged
excessive prices because they are uninsured or underinsured.
Judicial supervision of hospital-patient contracts generally proceeds
case by case, individualized on the level of the hospital or patient. Under
the broader fair pricing laws, hospitals are forced to curtail some of the
excessive pricing and collection practices for the financially vulnerable.
However, none of the consumer protection approaches address the
information asymmetries, the price distortions of provider market power,
or principal-agent problems that characterize the health care market. A
powerful hospital could still exact supracompetitive prices to the rest of
the market even if it must charge fairer prices to the uninsured or
underinsured patient.
E. Rate Regulation
Health economists who study the issue of health care pricing are less
sanguine than politicians about the ability of market strategies such as
transparency and CDHC to discipline hospital prices and curb health
care spending. Antitrust enforcers can do little to address extant provider
monopolies. Payment and delivery reforms are increasing provider
market consolidation while they try to improve health care quality and
efficiency. Consumer protection approaches have limited potential as a
systemic policy solution because they only protect a limited segment of
the population from excessive hospital prices. Thus, whether
enthusiastically or grudgingly, nearly every prominent health economist
or policy analyst with expertise in health care pricing ultimately
concludes that the only solution that may be effective in a concentrated

263. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54.
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264

provider market is regulation of health care prices. The best-known
example of rate regulation is Maryland’s all-payer rate setting model, but
other models include a version of rate-setting that allows some price
variation between hospitals, caps on rates negotiated by private payers,
or global budgets.
1.

All Payer Rate Setting

Under an all-payer system, hospitals are paid the same rate for a
given service by all payers, whether insurers, government programs, or
265
self-pay patients ineligible for charity care. The prices are set by either
a governmental agency using a public utility model or by collective
negotiation between representatives of hospitals and payers for prices
266
binding on all hospitals. Maryland is the only state currently using an
all-payer system that sets the prices for all payers through the regulatory,
public utility model. Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1971, Maryland
established an independent rate setting agency to set hospital rates for all
267
payers, including Medicare and Medicaid. The agency collects detailed
information about costs, patient volumes, hospital finances, and services
268
at each hospital to inform its rates. As for the latter model of
collectively negotiated prices, there are no examples from the United
States, but there are examples from Japan, Germany, France,
269
For consistency and
Switzerland, and other OECD countries.
administrative ease, the all-payer fee schedule could be based on
Medicare DRGs. To the extent that Medicare is not included in the all-

264. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 11, at 786–87; Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 979; Cutler &
Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969; Ginsburg, supra note 170; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152,
at 1073; Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?,
89 Or. L. Rev. 811, 840–41 (2011); Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost
Quality: The Maryland Experience, 28 Health Aff. 1395, 1395 (2009); Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing
Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key Groups of Americans, 29 Health Aff. 1, 10 (2010); N.J. Dep’t of
Health, supra note 27; Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2125; Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1086; Vladeck &
Rice, supra note 13, at 1312–13; White et al., supra note 147, at 330; Austin Frakt, Simply Put: AllPayer Rate Setting, Incidental Economist Blog (Apr. 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/
wordpress/simply-put-all-payer-rate-setting/.
265. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Equalizing Health Provider Rates: All-Payer
Rate Setting (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/ALL_PAYER_RATES-2010.pdf;
Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2129.
266. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 265, at 1.
267. See Murray, supra note 264, at 1395–96. Maryland received a waiver in 1971 to allow it to set
hospital rates for Medicare and Medicaid patients. A similar waiver from CMS would be required in
other states that want to include Medicare and Medicaid in its all-payer rates.
268. Id.
269. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal on Payment Reform, Health Aff. Blog (July 24, 2009),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/07/24/a-modest-proposal-on-payment-reform/ [hereinafter Reinhardt, A
Modest Proposal]; Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2129; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1313.
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payer system, the private rates could be expressed as a simple multiplier
270
of Medicare rates.
An all-payer system addresses many of the complexities and
perversities of hospital pricing. First, all-payer systems reduce or
eliminate price discrimination by creating uniform rates for everyone,
regardless of whether one is insured by a big health plan, a small plan, a
government program, workers compensation, or are a self-pay patient.
An all-payer approach flattens the inequities of price discrimination,
271
where those with the least bargaining power pay the highest prices.
Setting uniform rates for all payers also reduces the administrative costs
of negotiating with and maintaining separate billing systems for each
272
payer. These administrative costs are significant, with U.S. hospitals’
administrative costs totaling about twenty-five percent of their total
273
costs. Because of the fragmented payer landscape, U.S. hospitals spend
far more on administrative costs than other wealthy countries with all274
payer or single-payer systems.
Most importantly, all-payer rates combat the market power of
hospitals that drives price inflation, either because the rates are set by an
administrative body or by combining the bargaining power of all the
275
payers to negotiate lower prices. By constraining market power and
regulating prices, all-payer rate setting also has the potential to control
276
rising health care spending. As a result of its all-payer system,
Maryland has by far the lowest hospital price markups in the country,
almost a hundred times lower than New Jersey’s, a state that abandoned
277
its own all-payer system in 1992. Maryland’s all-payer rate setting has
278
effectively constrained growth in costs per hospital case. Skeptics note,
however, that the cost-per-case savings in Maryland’s system have been

270. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1313.
271. Murray, supra note 264, at 1400–01.
272. See Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2126.
273. David U. Himmelstein et al., A Comparison of Hospital Administrative Costs in Eight
Nations: US Costs Exceed All Others by Far, 33 Health Aff. 1586, 1589 (2014).
274. Id. at 1591–92.
275. See Frakt, supra note 264.
276. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 265, at 2; Graham Atkinson, State
Hospital Rate-Setting Revisited, 69 Commonwealth Fund 1332, 2 (Oct. 2009); Reinhardt, supra note
26, at 2129.
277. See Karan Chhabra, Chargemaster Tomfoolery, Policy Responses, and Unintended
Consequences (In Four Charts), Project Millennial Blog (May 17, 2013), http://projectmillennial.org/
2013/05/17/chargemaster-tomfoolery-policy-responses-and-unintended-consequences-in-four-charts/.
278. See Murray, supra note 261, at 1399, 1403. Maryland’s system is not perfect, however. Murray
further notes that although costs-per-admission, hospital length-of-stay, and hospital price inflation
have been curtailed, overall hospital cost growth has not been well-controlled due to increases in
patient volume.
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offset by increases in patient volume, so without other mechanisms to
279
control incentives to boost volume, the cost savings may be ephemeral.
The fact that Maryland’s was the sole rate setting program to
survive deregulation was due in part to its unique and valuable Medicare
waiver that allowed it to include Medicare prices as part of its rate setting
280
system, but it also resulted in higher than average Medicare rates.
Maryland’s Medicare waiver offset some of the financial pressures
exerted on the state’s hospitals from the all-payer model and ensured
continued cooperation from the hospitals.
To address the volume problem and reign in Medicare spending in
the state, Maryland has made adjustments to its rate setting program and
negotiated a new Medicare waiver with the Centers for Medicare and
281
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) starting in 2014. Maryland has agreed to
impose overall limits on per capita hospital spending to counteract
incentives to increase utilization and to contain its relatively high
282
Medicare reimbursements. In addition, Maryland must move eighty
percent of its hospitals’ revenue to population-based payments, the
principal method for which is a fixed, global budget for hospitals. Under
283
the fixed budget, the hospital has a low, but stable profit margin. If costs
exceed revenue, the agency will increase the hospitals’ prices the following
year to make up for the loss. But if the hospital comes in under budget,
284
its prices will be reduced the following year. In essence, Maryland has
moved from hospital rate-setting to rate-setting under a global budget.
Another variation of an all-payer system allows prices to vary
between hospitals to preserve competition. This market-based approach
to rate-setting permits hospitals to charge different prices from each
other, but the hospital is required to charge each of its payers the same
price (that is, no price discrimination) and post its percentage markup

279. See Mark Pauly & Robert Town, Maryland Exceptionalism? All-Payers Regulation and Health
Care System Efficiency, 37 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 697, 699 (2012); Kevin Outterson, All-Payer Rate
Setting in JAMA: A “Maryland Miracle?”, Incidental Economist Blog (Sept. 14, 2011, 6:00 AM)
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/all-payer-rate-setting-in-jama-a-maryland-miracle/.
280. John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 Health Aff. 142,
145 (1997); Lena H. Sun & Sarah Kliff, Maryland Already Sets Hospitals’ Prices. Now It Wants to Cap
Their Spending, Wash. Post WonkBlog (May 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkb
log/wp/2013/05/25/maryland-already-sets-hospitals-prices-now-it-wants-to-cap-their-spending/.
281. Maryland All-Payer Model, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., http://innovation.cms.
gov/initiatives/Maryland-All-Payer-Model/ (last updated Feb. 6, 2015).
282. Robert Murray, Maryland’s Bold Experiment in Reversing Fee-for-Service Incentives, Health
Aff. Blog (Jan. 28, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/28/marylands-bold-experiment-inreversing-fee-for-service-incentives/; Christine Vestal, Maryland May Be the Model for Curbing
Hospital Costs, USA Today (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/20
14/01/31/stateline-maryland-hospital-costs/5079073/.
283. Eduardo Porter, Lessons in Maryland for Costs at Hospitals, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/business/economy/lessons-in-maryland-for-costs-at-hospitals.html.
284. Id.
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above the standard rate to allow price comparisons with other
285
hospitals. This approach maintains price competition among hospitals
286
to allow for differences in quality, amenities, or input costs. Whatever
price is reached by the collective insurance negotiation with each hospital
would be the same price charged to self-pay patients, whether on
contracted or non-contracted health plans. Like the public utility model,
this approach would save hospitals the administrative costs of negotiating
different rates and maintaining separate billing procedures for each
payer.
In order to counteract hospital market power and keep prices in
check for “must-have” providers, insurers combine their bargaining
power and collectively negotiate with each provider, even if providers
287
are permitted to bargain separately. Balancing hospitals’ supply-side
monopolies with insurance buy-side monopsony power could reduce
price variations based on hospital market power, and whatever variations
in price that remain between hospitals would better reflect differences in
quality or amenities. Importantly, allowing insurers to come together to
bargain collectively with hospitals and providers is not the same thing as
concentrating the insurance market. The individual health plans would
still have to compete for their own customers, which would hopefully
288
drive down premiums.
Outside of Maryland, federal and state efforts to pursue all-payer
289
rate setting have been tentative but may be gaining steam. The ACA
created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which is
tasked with testing various payment and health care delivery approaches
290
for their ability to contain health care costs while improving quality.
The Center encourages states to test all-payer rate setting models that
include Medicare and Medicaid populations, which some economists
291
believe is important to make all-payer systems work well. Some states
have more recently examined all-payer systems, although none have yet
292
moved forward to implement such a system.

285. See Frakt, supra note 264; Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 66; Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal,
supra note 269; N.J. Comm’n on Rationalizing Health Care Res., supra note 27, at 100.
286. See Frakt, supra note 264; see also Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal, supra note 269.
287. Austin Frakt, All-Payer Rate Setting and Health Reform’s Underpants Gnomes Strategy,
Wash. Post WonkBlog (June 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/all-payerrate-setting-and-health-reforms-underpants-gnomes-strategy/2011/06/02/AG3SfHHH_blog.html.
288. Id.
289. At one time, in the 1970s, many states adopted all-payer rate setting models facilitated by
Congress, only to abandon them in the 1980s during the Reagan-era push for deregulation. See N.J.
Comm’n on Rationalizing Health Care Res., supra note 27, at 100.
290. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1115A (2010) (encouraging
development of new patient care models).
291. See Murray, supra note 264, at 1396; Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal, supra note 269.
292. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 265, at 2 (describing initiatives in
Minnesota, Oregon, and Massachusetts to examine some version of all-payer rate setting); N.J.
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Caps on Negotiated Prices for Private Health Plans

For those who are skeptical about the ability of regulators to
actually set hospital prices for all payers, an intermediate option would
be to establish caps on the prices hospitals can charge private health
plans or self-pay patients. This system would permit hospitals to continue
to discriminate amongst payers (charging different payers different rates
for the same services) and preserve the ability of hospitals to charge
different prices from each other, but it would limit the extent of price
variation by imposing a ceiling on prices. A broad cap on private payer
rates would improve payer bargaining position to resist price increases by
powerful hospitals or at least put a regulatory backstop on the degree to
which such hospitals can charge monopoly prices.
Although we do not have any examples within the United States of
such a system, Robert Murray, former Executive Director of Maryland’s
rate setting agency, suggested that the cap could be set as a multiple of
293
Medicare rates, such as 150 percent to 175 percent of Medicare. More
recently, health economics and policy experts from Dartmouth suggested
that all health care prices should be capped at 125 percent of Medicare
294
prices for all payers. Such a cap would particularly benefit uninsured
and out-of-network patients who are typically charged the highest prices.
The cap would thus have similar effects as the fair pricing laws that are
discussed in the previous section, although it would lack the protections
295
against hospital debt collection practices.
3.

Global Budgets

Under a global budget system, states impose total revenue limits on
296
hospitals to control both prices and utilization. A global budget is set

Comm’n on Rationalizing Health Care Res., supra note 27, at 100 (recommending that New Jersey
consider an all-payer approach).
293. See Robert Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments in the United
States, 37 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 679, 689 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, The Case for a
Coordinated System of Provider Payments]; Robert Murray, Nat’l Health Policy Forum, The
Cost of Hospital Care: Experience from Maryland’s All-payer Rate Setting System 21
(Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/documents/HSCRC_PolicyDocumentsReports/Presentations/
TheCostofHospitalCareNHPFR_Murray2010-10-08.pdf.
294. Jonathan Skinner et al., The 125 Percent Solution: Fixing Variations in Health Care Prices,
Health Aff. Blog (Aug. 26, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/08/26/the-125-percent-solutionfixing-variations-in-health-care-prices (“If every patient and every insurance company always had the
option of paying 125 percent of the Medicare price for any service, we would effectively cap the worst
of the price spikes. No longer would the tourist checked out at the ER for heat stroke be clobbered
with a sky-high bill. Nor would the uninsured single mother be charged 10 times the best price for her
child’s asthma care. This is not just another government regulation, but instead a protection plan that
shields consumers from excessive market power.”).
295. See supra Part II.D.2.
296. Rachel Block, Millbank Mem’l Fund, State Models for Health Care Cost
Measurement: A Policy and Operational Framework 7 (2015). Global budgets can also be
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prospectively for a hospital or integrated health system to cover the total
expected health care costs of a defined population for a given time
297
period. If the hospital or health system exceeds its budget, then it must
make up for the overrun in the following year’s budget, and if it comes in
under budget, the hospital can keep the surplus.
As discussed above, Maryland has begun to implement global
budgets on top of its rate setting system,298 but a state could move straight
to regulatory limits on hospital budgets without first establishing
standalone rate setting. Because hospital revenues are the result of a
combination of its prices, utilization, and operating costs, regulatory
oversight of total hospital revenues is a way to control both rates and
utilization by hospitals.
Notwithstanding the demise of Vermont’s single payer system,299 in
2012 the state implemented reforms to constrain total health care
spending through administrative review of hospital budgets.300 Hospitals
must submit their proposed budgets to the state’s Green Mountain Care
Board for review, and then the Board sets an annual budget for each
hospital based on hospital proposals.301 The Board may adjust a hospital’s
budget by ordering changes to a hospital’s rates or net revenues, or by
allowing hospitals to retain or use cash surpluses.302 The Board may
enforce hospital compliance with agreed upon budgets through courtordered injunction or imposition of civil administrative penalties.303
Vermont’s hospital budget review system is a step toward a global
budget system, under which the Board would set total payments and
revenues for hospitals from all payers to manage all of the health care for
a given population.304 Under the current hospital budget review process,

implemented by private payers, often called “Alternative Quality Contracts” or ACOs with two-sided
risk or “Total Cost of Care Contracts.” See, e.g., Zirui Song et al., The ‘Alternative Quality Contract,’
Based on a Global Budget, Lowered Medical Spending and Improved Quality, 31 Health Aff. 1885,
1885–86 (2012); Ann Robinow, Commonwealth Fund, The Potential of Global Payment: Insights
from the Field 1, 3(2010).
297. See Song et al., supra note 296, at 1885.
298. See supra text accompanying note 281.
299. 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 48 (enacting Vermont’s single payer system); Sarah Kliff, How
Vermont’s Single-Payer Health Care Dream Fell Apart, Vox.com (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.vox.com/
2014/12/22/7427117/single-payer-vermont-shumlin (describing how Vermont’s single payer plan would
cost an estimated $2.5 billion in additional tax revenue, up from earlier estimates of $1.6 billion).
300. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 9456 (2014); 4-7 Vt. Code R. §§ 3:3.100–3.3.500 (2014). See generally,
The Green Mountain Guide to Hospital Budget Review (Aug. 2012), http://gmcboard.vermont.gov/
sites/gmcboard/files/GMCB%20Hospital%20Budget%20Review.pdf.
301. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 9456(a)–(d) (2014); 4-7 Vt. Code R. § 3:3.300 (2014).
302. 4-7 Vt. Code R. § 3:3.400 (2014).
303. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 9456(h) (2014).
304. Zack Budryk, VT Hospitals Eye “Global Budget” Payment Model, Fierce Health Fin. (Apr. 15,
2014), http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/vt-hospitals-eye-global-budget-payment-model/2014-04-15;
Morgan True, Vermont to Launch Global Budget Pilot for Hospitals, VTDigger.org (Apr. 14, 2014),
http://vtdigger.org/2014/04/14/vermont-launch-global-budget-pilot-hospitals/.
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Vermont hospitals still negotiate rates with each commercial payer, but
under the global budget system the Board would set a uniform rate
increase for each hospital applicable to all payers, eliminating the
hospital’s contract negotiations with each payer.305 Both Maryland and
Vermont have experienced success under their hospital budget
programs: in its first year with global budgets, Maryland saved more than
$100 million,306 and Vermont’s hospitals requested a total budget increase
of just 3.6% for fiscal year 2016.307 Global budgets as implemented in
Maryland or anticipated in Vermont are more comprehensive than rate
setting because they incorporate mechanisms to control all the
components of total health care spending: prices, utilization, and hospital
operating costs.
4.

Rate Regulation Measured Against Health Care Market Failures

Rate regulation is the only proposed price-disciplining policy
solution that addresses the problem of provider market power.
Administrative rate regulation addresses provider market power by
administrative price setting through a pure monopsony and removing the
element of negotiation from hospital pricing, similar to the way Medicare
308
sets prices for all participating hospitals. Alternatively, the rate setting
model could combine all payers’ market power in an oligopsony to
309
By doing away with price
bargain against hospitals on prices.
discrimination within the hospital, all-payer rate setting would reduce
administrative complexity and costs for providers, simplifying billing, and
drastically reducing the number of parties with which providers must
310
negotiate prices.
With respect to information asymmetries, rate regulation could
promote transparency of price and quality because the prices would be
publicly available. Therefore, standardized payments and reporting could

305. Richard Slusky, Dir. of Payment Reform, Proposed Pilot Payment Reform Projects:
Consideration of Hospital Global Budget Pilot, at Slide 21 (Mar. 27, 2014), http://gmcboard.
vermont.gov/sites/gmcboard/files/Global_Budgets032714.pdf.
306. Audie Cornish & Andrea Hsu, In Maryland, A Change in How Hospitals Are Paid Boosts
Public Health, NPR.org (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/10/23/451212483/
in-maryland-a-change-in-how-hospitals-are-paid-boosts-public-health.
307. Nancy Remsen, Hospitals in Vermont Anticipate Modest Budget Increases Next Year, Seven
Days (July 23, 2015), http://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2015/07/23/hospitals-invermont-anticipate-modest-budget-increases-next-year. The Chair of the Green Mountain Care
Board, Al Gobeille, noted that the average rate increase Vermont hospitals requested from insurers
was only 4.3%, the lowest rate increase in fifteen years. Id.
308. Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1312.
309. Id.
310. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 270, at 1593 (noting that if U.S. hospitals’ administrative
costs were shifted to the levels seen in Canada or Scotland on a per capita basis, the United States
would have saved from $156 billion to $158 billion in 2011, the equivalent of about one percent of
GDP).
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result in better and more comparable data on prices, product (bundled
episodes of care), and quality. All-payer rate setting can also be
augmented with market strategies to address price insensitivity from
moral hazard. In the market-based approach to rate setting, hospitals are
permitted to charge different prices from one another, and the different
prices and quality scores could be used by payers to structure reference
311
pricing or tiering programs.
Rate regulation reduces the externalities of hospital pricing, because
under both systems the uninsured or out-of-network patient would not
be charged unfair or inflated charges. All-payer rate setting eliminates
price discrimination, and therefore evens out much of the variability and
disparate pricing that harms the financially vulnerable patient. In
addition, the prices set through rate setting systems can help hospitals
internalize the costs borne by financially vulnerable patients by
incorporating the costs of uncompensated care into the price, much the
312
way Medicare adjusts hospital rates. Nevertheless, the uninsured
patient may still struggle to pay her hospital bills even if charged the
regulated price, and all-payer rate setting does not necessarily address
balance billing, hospital debt collection practices, or financial assistance
policies for the most financially vulnerable. Consumer protections could
be added to an all-payer approach through state funds to reimburse
hospitals for indigent or uncompensated care and fair debt collection
313
laws.
The biggest blind spot of rate regulation is that it does not fully
address the principal-agent problem leading to overutilization of health
care. As demonstrated by Maryland’s experience, the financial
constraints imposed on hospitals from rate regulation on a per case basis
314
create an incentive to drive up the volume of care. Paradoxically,
providing more health care is not necessarily in the patient’s interests.
Higher rates of health care utilization result in patient health outcomes
315
that are no better, and often worse, than lower utilization. Thus, a
major challenge for designers of systems of rate regulation is to address
the need to control incentives toward increased utilization. Maryland is
addressing this problem by moving its hospitals to a global budget, which

311. Robert Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments in the United States,
37 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 679, 684 (2012).
312. Murray, supra note 264, at 1397.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 247–48.
314. Murray, supra note 264, at 1403; Pauly & Town, supra note 279, at 699–700; Outterson, supra
note 279.
315. See Fisher et al., Regional Variations of Medicare Spending Part 2, supra note 202, at 293.
More health care is worse for patients because every admission, test, or procedure comes with risks of
complications. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 69, at 5; Aaron E. Carroll, Doing More for Patients
Often Does No Good, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/upshot/doingmore-for-patients-often-does-no-good-.html.
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removes the possibility of increasing revenue through increased volume,
and creates incentives to keep patients healthy within and outside the
316
hospital. In essence, rate regulation needs to incorporate payment and
delivery reforms like ACOs to address the principal-agent problems in
health care.
Establishing global budgets is no simple matter. Measuring per
capita spending on a provider basis, creating and reconciling the global
budget for each provider, and defining the population for which the
health system will be accountable, are complicated, politically fraught,
317
and technically challenging tasks. In addition, a global budget system
inherently shifts risk to health care providers, who may not be equipped
318
to manage this financial risk.
Despite the challenges, if overall health care spending is to be
contained, global budgets appear to be an essential component of a rate
319
regulation strategy. Rate regulation disciplines prices while global
budgets constrain volume and utilization.
None of the proposed policy prescriptions in this Part address all of
the features of health care market failure. The policy prescription
necessarily must include a combination of approaches. The theory of
second best posits that if one or more of the market imperfections cannot
be addressed, then correcting the other market imperfections will not
necessarily improve patient-consumer welfare and in fact make outcomes
worse. Fortunately, the policy approaches are mutually reinforcing rather
than mutually exclusive. A discussion of the implications of the policyagainst-market-failure analysis follows in Part III.
III. Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation
Each of the policies has shortcomings, so which policy or combination
of policies should be adopted to discipline health care prices? Applying the
policy-against-market-failure framework sheds light on the effectiveness
of any particular approach to controlling health care prices and reveals a
dynamic interplay between the various market imperfections and policy
solutions.
A. Conclusions for Noncompetitive Provider Markets
The first and most significant conclusion from a coordinated analysis
of all the policy solutions is that all approaches except rate regulation fall
316. See supra text accompanying notes 279–81.
317. See Porter, supra note 283 (describing Maryland’s challenge in applying global budgets to
metropolitan areas where patients have more than one hospital to choose from, thus complicating
patient attribution for budgeting purposes).
318. Song et al., supra note 296, at 1885–86.
319. Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 Health Aff. 759, 767
(2008); Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1309.
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short when applied in concentrated health care provider markets. The
politically popular market approaches (such as price transparency or
CHDC) and payment and delivery reforms (such as ACOs) will not
control health care prices in concentrated markets. For noncompetitive
health care markets, market solutions will be ineffective at disciplining
provider prices because market solutions rely fundamentally on some
320
level of choice among competitors. No amount of transparency,
network narrowing, or consumer skin in the game will provide choices
where none exist. Without choices, market forces will not have much
effect on prices. Market strategies have a more limited role for
noncompetitive markets: to reward high-quality and high-value hospitals
and ensure adequacy of supply of needed services. If hospitals are
permitted to charge different rates from each other, then strategies like
reference pricing and tiering can be used to reward high-value hospitals
321
and encourage competition on quality and services.
For the increasing proportion of the country with noncompetitive
provider markets, the only policy that can address the market power of
providers is rate regulation. There are two policy alternatives to correct
322
monopolies: antitrust laws and rate regulation. As described above,
antitrust laws can do little to reverse existing monopolies and bring about
323
a competitive market. Thus, for noncompetitive provider markets, the
only solution remaining is rate regulation. Rate regulation addresses
hospital market power by combining the bargaining leverage of all
payers together or eliminating price negotiations with payers in favor of
324
administratively established rates. The inescapable implication of this
analysis is that for the vast majority of this country with concentrated
provider markets, health care rate regulation must be a central part of
any policy strategy to control health care spending.
A predictable criticism of rate regulation is that it is less efficient
than markets in determining prices because the agencies or bodies
charged with setting rates become bogged down in bureaucratic difficulty
and are subject to agency capture. These concerns point to the sensible
conclusion that rate regulation is difficult to do well, and highlight the
importance of institutional design to avoid the capture, bureaucratic
inefficiency, and crippling complexity that can make rate regulation
ineffective. Another practical challenge with rate regulation is that it is
politically unpopular in many jurisdictions, where the tendency is to
oppose regulation of any sort in favor of letting the market do the job.
The central conclusion of this article is that notwithstanding these
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1085.
See supra text accompanying notes 282–83.
Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 40 (3d ed. 2000).
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.E.3.
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challenges, policymakers have few options other than rate regulation to
constrain health care prices in concentrated markets. The premise is that
the market has failed, and in noncompetitive markets, market approaches
are fundamentally unable to restore the competition necessary for market
forces to work.
The second conclusion from this policy-against-market-failure
analysis is that no single solution or approach is sufficient to address all the
market failures, and a combination of approaches is necessary to correct the
numerous health care market imperfections. In noncompetitive provider
markets, rate regulation should be augmented by payment and delivery
reforms to address the principal-agent problem of demand inducement by
physicians that rate regulation fails to correct.
The policy prescription to discipline prices in noncompetitive health
care markets starts but does not end with rate regulation. Because health
care markets suffer from multiple failures, it is insufficient to correct the
market power problem but not the other imperfections. The theory of
second best posits that where there are multiple market failures,
correcting one imperfection but leaving the others unaddressed may not
improve social welfare, and in some cases, may make consumers worse
325
off. Rate regulation does not correct the overconsumption of health
services through provider-induced demand, and we saw that Maryland
had to modify its all-payer system by constraining total hospital spending
within global budgets, which creates the financial imperative for hospitals
to reduce overall health care costs through strategies that look a lot like
326
ACOs.
Just because rate regulation is necessary to control health care
prices does not make it easy. Creating an all-payer system that also can
accommodate innovations in payment and delivery like ACOs can be
extremely complex, and this complexity can be nettlesome enough to
327
sink the entire enterprise. Indeed, many of the rate setting programs in
states other than Maryland were abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s due
to the inability to incorporate managed care models into the system and
the belief that rate setting was no longer necessary or desirable in the
328
managed care era. In addition, rate regulation would almost certainly
result in lower payments for the most powerful hospitals, so implementing
rate regulation is politically difficult, unless hospitals otherwise facing

325. Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 11, 11 (1956) (“The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is
introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the
Paretian conditions, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer
desirable.”).
326. See Porter, supra note 283.
327. See McDonough, supra note 280, at 144.
328. Id.
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financial difficulties see some benefits to rate regulation, such as reduced
329
administrative costs and more stable, if constrained, revenues over time.
Although prices would be limited for the most vulnerable, ideally
rate regulation should be augmented with laws that limit hospitals’ debt
collection and balance billing practices for financially vulnerable patients
330
and other consumer protections. Even a regulated health care market
produces externalities that could be curbed with stronger protections for
individuals who need but cannot afford their health care.
B. What to Do with Competitive Health Care Markets
Although no health care market remains highly competitive, there
are areas scattered throughout the country where the health care provider
331
market remains relatively unconcentrated. What policies should be
adopted for these markets?
The policy-against-market-failure analysis leads to a different set of
policy prescriptions for competitive health care markets. Here, market
332
strategies may be able to constrain hospital prices. To harness the
market pressure on prices, private payers and employers would have to
collect and report price and quality information in a form that is useful to
patients, bargain aggressively to create meaningful price options, and
monitor claims data to ensure value and quality within lower-priced
333
options. Legislation is necessary to force some of these changes,
including price and quality transparency requirements at the individual
or plan level, formation of all-payer claims databases, and legislation to
prohibit powerful providers from putting anti-tiering clauses in their health
plan contracts. In order to work, the market approaches for disciplining
health care prices require nearly as much regulation as rate regulation.
The second major difference between noncompetitive and
competitive health care markets is how to address the provider market

329. Hospitals, especially nonprofit hospitals, are facing significant financial uncertainties as
Medicare cuts hospital reimbursement rates. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Nonprofit Hospitals’ 2013
Revenue Lowest Since Recession, Report Says, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/27/business/nonprofit-hospitals-2013-revenue-lowest-since-recession-report-says.html. The political
hurdles to effectuating any of these policy solutions are a related issue that is beyond the scope of this
Article.
330. See supra notes 248–49. Alternatively, a single-payer approach would offer protections against
the externalities of hospital prices through universal coverage.
331. Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966 (calculating that one-sixth of hospital markets
in the United States are unconcentrated, with an HHI between 100 and 1500).
332. See, e.g., Avi Dor et al., Medicare’s Hospital Compare Quality Reports Appear to Have Slowed
Price Increases for Two Major Procedures, 34 Health Aff. 71, 72 (2015); Pauly & Town, supra note
279, at 706 (arguing that in competitive hospital markets, market approaches (supplemented by
significant regulatory support, antitrust enforcement, and tax reforms) will be more effective at
constraining hospital prices than a rate-setting approach).
333. See Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n, supra note 3, at 3.
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334

power problem. In competitive markets, market approaches must be
paired with aggressive antitrust enforcement to prevent further
concentration or consolidation of the provider market. States could further
protect competition by reducing barriers to entry and competition caused
335
by archaic CON law regimes. All of these actions to promote competition
would likely be opposed by powerful incumbent hospital systems, and are
therefore politically challenging.
Although different policy prescriptions emerge for competitive
versus noncompetitive markets, policymaking is generally done at the
level of the state, not the individual locality, and no state in the country
336
has an entirely competitive health care market. It may be unworkable
to establish a bilateral regulatory system where competitive submarkets
are permitted to use market approaches to set prices but noncompetitive
neighbors are subject to rate regulation. Should a state implement rate
setting where some of its hospital markets remain competitive but others
are not?
The answer may depend to what degree the state or its population
centers are dominated by concentrated versus unconcentrated markets.
Every sign points to a trend of increasing consolidation, so we can expect
many of the remaining competitive markets to slide toward
concentration, and antitrust enforcement has historically failed to prevent
this loss of competition. Providers and payers everywhere are busy
implementing ACOs and similar integration strategies to curtail the
incentives for overutilization and improve quality in health care, but this
effort comes with an accelerated surge in consolidation. Thus, even for
the few unconcentrated health care markets remaining, a market-based
approach to health care price containment may be elusive in practice.

Conclusion
We all experience the harms of unpredictable and uncontrollable
health care prices every time we interact with the health care system, but
especially when we set foot in a hospital. We hold our breath, wait for
the bills and (if we are lucky) the mystifying “explanation of benefits” to
accumulate. We try to make sense of the jargon and codes, and even if
we have insurance, we have no way of knowing whether we got a good
price or just got ripped off. If you happen to be uninsured or out-ofnetwork, the financial nightmare unfolds from there as debt collection
commences on your bill, wrecking your credit score, raiding your wages
or home, or worse. The individual harms are compounded by the societal
334. The rest of the policy prescription for competitive markets looks a lot like noncompetitive
markets, with payment and delivery reforms to address overutilization and consumer protections to
correct for externalities imposed on financially vulnerable patients.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
336. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966, fig.3.
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harms of uncontrolled health care spending (driven in large part by
unrestrained prices), which drags down our paychecks, savings, and
resources for all other social programs. Our excess and undisciplined
health care prices derive from a broken system rife with market failures
and beg for a regulatory solution.
So what is a policymaker to do? Policymakers are confronted by a
menu of policy solutions of mind-boggling complexity. For this reason, it
is difficult to assess which policy approach to pursue in a given
jurisdiction. The policy-against-market-failure framework set forth in this
article provides a method to evaluate the policy approaches
comprehensively and simultaneously and gauge the policies’
effectiveness for a particular market. The clearest message of the policyagainst-market failure analysis is that any effective solution to discipline
health care prices must contend with the problem of the growing market
power of the provider.
The majority of the U.S. population lives in a highly concentrated
hospital market; for these noncompetitive provider markets, the only
policy prescription to discipline health care prices is rate regulation to
address provider market power. Rate regulation alone is insufficient,
however, and it must be paired with payment and delivery reforms to
address principal-agent problems and incentives toward overutilization.
For the minority of the United States that lives in an unconcentrated
health care market, market approaches like price and quality
transparency may constrain health care prices, but only to the degree
that aggressive antitrust enforcement is able to stave off the slide toward
consolidation. The reality is that the competitive health care market is an
endangered species, living in an increasingly noncompetitive ecosystem.
Policymakers at the state level will rarely have the luxury of relying on
competition to contain health care prices for all markets within their
state’s borders. To reap the benefits of increased health care integration
and coordination, perhaps the best option is to accept the inevitable
consolidation of health care providers but regulate prices like a utility.
The story of our unchecked health care spending in the United
States is a story about high and undisciplined prices. Our health care
pricing problem is driven at its core by a growing provider monopoly
problem. The only policy capable of addressing the provider monopoly
problem is rate regulation. The inescapable conclusion is that we must
resurrect health care rate regulation and place it in the center of any
policy approach to control our health care spending.

